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Abstract
This thesis is about designing a distributed system that transparently [6] sup­
ports fault tolerance. In order to provide this, a lightweight language, the 
Fault Tolerant Distributed Language(ffdi\), has been developed which sup­
ports the essential features required to enable fault tolerance. This language 
is the user interface into the runtime fault tolerant distributed architecture. 
By adopting a hybrid approach based on existing work in distributed systems, 
a model for distributed fault tolerant computation has been constructed based 
on distributed shared memory and communicating processes. The effective­
ness of the model in the face of failure is measured. The manner in which the 
model deals with failures, the degradation of the system in the face of failures 
and the overhead associated with the fault tolerant components is explored. 
Overall, the model has successfully shown the requirements to build a trans­
parent fault tolerant system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A distributed system consists of multiple autonomous computers interacting 
with each other. This collection of computers can be referred to as a net­
work [23]. Tanenbaum [23] states that two computers are interconnected 
if they are able to share information. The connection medium can be any­
thing; for example a cable, a system bus or microwaves. Autonomous means 
that one computer cannot directly control another, for example it cannot make 
the other computer start or stop. The computers interact with each other by 
transm itting messages over their connection medium. Every computer rep­
resents a node on the network, and the links correspond to the connection 
medium joining all the computers together. This definition excludes the clas­
sification of multi-processor computers as representing a distributed system.
The work presented in this thesis attempts to provide an environment where 
distributed systems can be developed that can tolerate arbitrary failures up 
to the number of processes replicated. To this end, a distributed language 
and runtime environment has been developed, known as the Fault Tolerant 
Distributed Language (ftdl). The ftdl system provides a simple language, run­
time support system and simulator. The language is lightweight, but serves 
to provide the minimal support necessary for providing fault tolerance at the 
language level. The runtime system manages the inter-node communication 
as well as incorporating the fault detection mechanism. A simulator has been
1
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developed on which the ftdl environment can exist.
A simple way to describe a failure is to describe it as “something has gone 
wrong”, that is the failed component did not produce the result it was sup­
posed to. Note, a failure is different to a “bug”. A bug is a defect in a compo­
nent, whereas a failure is something tha t occurs unexpectedly which causes 
the component not to behave as was expected. For example, consider a simple 
computer program th a t is supposed to add two numbers and output the result. 
In a “buggy” implementation, say, it multiplies the results instead of adding 
them. So an input of 2+3 results in 6 and not 5. An example of a failure in this 
scenario would be the termination of the program without printing a result 
during a particular execution of the program. A “bug” is thus a programatic 
error, whereas a fault is an error which occurs during execution.
The ftdl system attem pts to provide solutions for fault tolerance against fail 
stop and Byzantine failures. A fail stop is a failure tha t is marked by a change 
of state -  usually from a running state to a stopped state. This failure can 
be detected by other processors. Byzantine failures are more awkward to 
deal with. Failures of this type are difficult, and in some cases, impossible 
to detect. When Byzantine failure occurs it appears as if something else has 
failed, it is as if the failing entity has “covered” its tracks.
Distributed applications are built on distributed systems. A distributed ap­
plication runs on two or more nodes of a distributed system; a non-distributed 
application, on the other hand, only runs on a single node. A distributed ap­
plication can be separated into the following layers:
1. User code
2. Distributed environment executive
3. Network layer interface
The user code layer is the code w ritten by the programmer to deal with the 
application being implemented. The distributed executive is the component
2
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that controls the communication between the remote computers. It provides 
the interface between the application code on a particular node on the net­
work and the code on another node, via the network. Some environments 
provide language libraries which the application programmer uses to provide 
the distributed capability to the program. BSD so c k e ts  [20] are an example 
of this.
The distributed executive may need to need to translate the data received 
from the remote computers into a format understood by the user code, sim­
ilarly the executive may need to translate data to be passed to the remote 
computer from the user code into a form that is understood by the network 
layer. This is done by an interface to the distributed executive. In a system 
like CORBA [25], this interface is the generated stubs from the specification, 
expressed in IDL. The ORB runtime converts these structures, which the user 
code uses in a language dependent way, into a format understood by other 
CORBA applications, that is, the data is converted into an implementation 
language independent form.
Some environments, however, implement their distributed environment through 
a language, as SR [4] shows. Here, the interface to the executive is built into 
the language itself in terms of constructs and expressions. An example of this 
is the in  statement, described by Andrews et al. in “An Overview of the SR  
Language and Implementation” [4].
One form of the in  statem ent takes the form: 
in  communication_endpoint
and synchronisation.expression by scheduling_expression —> 
body of in 
n i
This blocks the currently executing process until it receives data on the com­
munication endpoint specified and the synchronisation expression is satisfied. 
The data is delivered in the order specified by the scheduling expression. This
3
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allows the programmer to explicitly control how to deliver the data. For ex­
ample, Andrews et al. describe a bounded buffer with an insert operation 
specified as follows:
in  insert(item) and count < size
This is telling the distributed executive that the current process is waiting 
for data which is meant to be delivered to the insert communication endpoint. 
This process will execute the body of the in  statem ent only if the value of the 
local variable count is less than  the value of the local size. This expression is 
evaluated every time the executive considers allowing execution to continue 
for the blocked process.
When interfacing to the network layer, the executive implements the commu­
nication subsystem. This defines the format of messages th a t are transferred 
between nodes of the system.
As well as this task, other communication derived tasks m ust be performed: 
such as routing messages, managing message timeouts, retransmissions, - 
dealing with new connections and removing old ones. These may be built on 
top of the underlying network protocols.
Figure 1.1 presents an example of querying a remote bank for the balance of 
a bank account. At Computer A, the user code is calling the queryBalance
4
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operation on an account object, the result of which will be stored in the vari­
able balance. The account object, however, is actually a remote object, i.e. 
it lives on another machine. For the purposes of this example, let the query- 
Balance () request initiate a t Computer A  and it will be routed through the 
network to the where the account object exists — Computer B.
The queryBalance operation, is thus a remote invocation, which can be de­
composed into the following steps:
1. D istributed Executive.
(a) The translation of the statem ent account. queryBalance () is made 
by the interface to the distributed executive. This takes all the in­
formation known about the current call — the operation name, tar­
get object and location of the object -  and puts the information into
a format to be used by the distributed executive. This translation 
can be expressed as:
send queryBalance operation to Jack’s Account at “First 
Savings Corp., Main St.”.
The destination for the request will be Computer B.
(b) The distributed executive translates this data into something that 
the network layer interface can use.
2. Network Interface Layer. Takes the data from distributed execu­
tive, attaches network addressing information (which allows the net­
work layer to determine to which machine the message is going) and 
then converts this data into a form which can be written onto the net­
work.
In practice, a distributed system will be concerned with routing messages 
from computers to computers. Typically applications will be w ritten on a 
multi-tasking operating system so the applications are more concerned with 
messages going from a process running on one computer to another process
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on another computer. The term  process refers to w hat the host operating sys­
tem regards as a process. The application code executes in the context of an 
operating system process.
Due to the complexities of a distributed system, there are many type of failure 
which can occur: hardware, software and network. An example of a hardware 
would be the power supply of a computer (i.e. a node) short circuiting, re­
sulting in the computer to stop functioning. An example of software failure 
would be an incorrect result being returned from a function. A network failure 
occurs when the medium connecting the computers in a distributed system 
fails. Each of these component failures occur with varying probabilities and 
the ability to detect failures also varies. Software failures can be impossible 
to detect, where is it can be quite easy to detect hardware or network failure. 
Bearing the above restrictions in mind, the work presented here is concerned 
with general failures and the ability to design and implement a system which 
can handle failure.
One of the advantages of a distributed system is tha t it can facilitate co­
operation without centralised control, but also can provide higher reliability 
and availability. It can be designed to allow the masking of failures, thus 
increasing its availability. Many applications are naturally distributed, for 
example a network of automated teller machines. Distributed environments 
can be used to aid the efficient use of resources through load balancing.
These advantages come with some drawbacks. As there are many more com­
ponents -  processors, network connections, inter-processor connections, etc. 
-  a higher probability of failure exists over single processor based solutions. 
If a single component in the distributed system fails, this should not mean 
that the entire distributed application m ust stop functioning. In order to en­
sure this does not happen, a distributed application m ust be able to continue 
function in presence of failures, tha t is it m ust be fault-tolerant. Many dis­
tributed languages have failed to fully integrate fault tolerance into their en­
vironments, leaving fault tolerance to be implemented in an ad-hoc and incon­
sistent manner on various systems by the application developer. By making
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fault-tolerance an application level concern, it requires th a t the application 
developer must focus on fault tolerance as well as the application she is a t­
tempting to develop. It also requires that the application developer be an 
expert in fault-tolerance techniques. These goals cannot always be met so to 
build truly robust fault-tolerant systems this critical feature m ust not lay in 
the application layer, but in distributed executive layer.
In order to ensure an effective, transparent fault tolerant distributed system, 
all the layers of the distributed environment m ust be modified to provide fault 
tolerance. If this does not occur, the amount of fault tolerance that can be 
provided to the application decreases. For example, one of the guarantees 
required for the network layer is the ability to bound message transmission 
times between two processes on separate computers. Clearly this can only 
be done with certain types of networks [23], such as fixed time-slice networks 
but with other types, like wide-area networks or Ethernet, this is not possible. 
The consequence on fault tolerance in this case would be an algorithm that 
cannot accurately use time to determine if a process has failed, so the overall 
ability to provide full fault tolerance has been reduced considerably.
1.1 Roadmap
This thesis presents the work in three major parts. The first reviews the cur­
rent literature on providing fault tolerance to distributed systems. This is 
done by presenting a literature review, starting in  Chapter 2. The next chap­
ter describes the various ways in which synchronisation can be achieved in 
a fault tolerant manner. Chapter 3 also examines providing language exten­
sions to provide existing systems with fault tolerant capabilities. The chapter 
concludes by describing the process model and approach adopted by the ftdl 
system. Chapter 4 describes the ftdl system components and its simulation 
environment. The effectiveness of the model is presented in the results chap­
ter, Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the concluding remarks.
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1.2 Presentation  Notes
Many of the structure diagrams presented in this thesis use the Unified Mod­
elling Language [10] notation. These are primarily found in Chapters 3 and 4.
When presenting examples from the f t d l  language, a courier small caps font 
is used: an f t d l  l a n g u a g e  e x a m p l e  . Reserved words in f t d l  are presented 
in a sans serifed bold font: the reserved typeface. This same font is used when 
presenting the machine op-codes of the simulation machine. The op-codes of 
the machine are presented as three character instructions. Examples from 
other programming languages are presented in a simple courier font: some 
o th e r  lang uage fo n t.
8
Chapter 2
L iterature R eview
There are a number of approaches to providing fault-tolerance to distributed 
systems. This chapter identifies and examines some of those currently in 
existence. Some of the algorithms only apply to distributed shared memory 
systems, others to database systems and some to distributed, inter-acting pro­
cesses. Before selecting an approach to take, the type of distributed system 
needs to be determined. By examining the different systems, a set of require­
ments can be derived for constructing a system th a t tolerates failure.
2.1 Defining Failure
One of the methods for implementing fault tolerance is the use of replicas. 
The processes that make up the distributed system are replicated on other 
processing nodes. A replica of a process is copy of that process tha t does not 
exist on the same node as the process being replicated. Typically a replica 
is another process running on another machine, executing the same program 
that is being replicated. Once a fault is detected, the faulty process is stopped 
and one of the replicas becomes the ‘main’ process. All commands issued to 
the main process are also propagated to the other replicas, thus ensuring at 
any time tha t all the replicas have the same state — that is all the process local 
variables of the replicas have the same value. This is the method explained
9
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by Schneider [18].
This method can be used by a message passing architecture as well as dis­
tributed shared memory (DSM) systems [5]. For DSM systems, it is the mem­
ory tha t is replicated, not the process. All changes made to shared memory 
are propagated to its replicas.
The ideas central to the issue of fault tolerance can be considered as: replica 
management, fault detection, recovery and reconfiguration. Replica manage­
ment can be thought of as deciding which processes to replicate, how to repli­
cate them, how to propagate changes to these copies and where to keep the 
replicas. Replication has a time and space overhead associated with it, so one 
of the issues when designing a fault tolerant system is: are all processes tha t 
make up the distributed application replicated or only a select few? Another 
issue tha t must be addressed is the form taken by replicas, some systems 
store replicas as duplicate processes, as indicated by Bakken and Schlicht- 
ing [5], others store to reliable secondary storage. A design decision needs to 
be made for which alternative is chosen.
A fairly loose definition, given by Bal et al., of a fault tolerant distributed 
system is:
‘A  system is fault tolerant i f  it still continues to function properly 
in the face of processor crashes, allowing distributed programs to 
continue their execution and allowing users to keep on using the 
system.” [6]
This definition is lacking as it does not fully define failure, they are only con­
cerned with total failure (fail stop) of computers (nodes) on network. It does 
not deal with partial or Byzantine failures. These are much harder to deal 
with but are an important issue in distributed system implementation.
The above definition does not take into account the issue of network or other 
failure categories. As distributed systems are comprised of many components, 
it is better to deal with the term failing system components. Let us take the
10
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above term to mean a component or process in the system, i.e. a processor 
is a node on the network (a processing unit), not the physical processor it­
self. In this manner a network failure becomes another failure category for a 
distributed system.
How can process (i.e. a system component) failure be accurately detected? A 
process tha t is detected as failed, due to some time constraint, may be execut­
ing on a machine that may be busy, or the communications channel may have 
slowed down due to extra network traffic. Has the process failed or is it slow 
to respond [14]? This leads to a faulty process being defined 1 as:
“a faulty process is one who’s behaviour is no longer consistent with
its specification.” [18]
The failure types can be categorised as fail stop or Byzantine [18]. Fail stop 
is defined as a state change. This state allows other processes to detect it 
has failed. A Byzantine failure, on the other hand, can cause malicious, un- 
dectable behaviour [15]. A component which has failed through a Byzantine 
failure can lead the failure detection mechanisms believe another component 
has failed. These class of failures are very good at masking the actual compo­
nent which is faulty.
A major issue raised with faulty processes is tha t of the recovery of the failed 
entity. The system not only needs to take into account failed processes that 
restart but also deal with processes that have restarted during or after recov­
ery mechanisms tha t have taken place.
Though this definition is concerned primarily with faulty processes, it can be 
applied to the other components in a distributed system. It is vital to take 
into account the different components which may fail. These may be the pro­
cess itself (software failure), the computer on which it is running (hardware 
failure) or the network (network failure). A faulty component is one th a t has
1This definition, though not rigorous, can be broadly in terp re ted  as m eaning th a t  a faulty 
process is one th a t has stopped working.
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stopped behaving the way it is expected to. Applying this definition to the 
network component, the network has failed when it cannot route a message 
from one node to another.
2.2 Approaches To H andling Faults
Currently, the options language designers have taken for handling fault tol­
erance are identified in Programming Languages for Distributed Systems [6]:
Ignore. Ignore the fact that faults exist, i.e. nothing will inhibit or stop the 
processes. However, a program executing on several computers has a 
higher chance of failing than when running on one.
When a process tries to communicate with one that has failed, it may 
be blocked forever or get a communication error and terminate. Bal et 
al. [6] note tha t since processor crashes are rare, a language th a t ignores 
faults is not a major problem.
This may be true when the only failing component is a CPU, but if the 
failed entity is another component of the distributed system, this man­
ner of ‘handling’ faults is not entirely acceptable. A solution applicable 
to a distributed system must be found.
Programmer. Let the programmer handle faults. The language run-time 
system will return an error code (or raise an exception) to the concerned 
(distributed) processes that want to interact with the failed process. It 
is then up to the programmer to handle faults.
This approach is adequate if failed processes have no side-effects. For 
example, if the process that fails just returns the balance in a bank ac­
count, another process can be invoked by the language run-time sys­
tem. However, if the process must, say, obtain a database record lock 
and fails before releasing it, starting a new process will not solve the 
problem. This later process has a side-effect of obtaining a resource. A
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mechanism is required to ensure an action runs to completion or not at 
all.
Language Support. One construct that aids a programmer in defining sys­
tem components as fault tolerant is the use of atomic instructions. This 
support is supplied through the run-time system and the language gr­
ammar itself.
FT-Linda [5] is an enhancement to the Linda [2] programming system 
that provides fault-tolerance. Here, the concept of an atomic guarded 
statem ent is added to the language. The purpose of this is to indicate to 
the runtime environment which tuple spaces are required for the trans­
action; once these are secured, the body of the statem ent then executes 
as atomic transactions. This is discussed in the section Atomic Transac­
tions in section 2.3.
Transparent Fault-Tolerance. e.g. fault tolerant message passing. This 
has been suggested by Borg et al. [9]. For each process an inactive backup 
process is created at another node. All messages to the primary process 
are sent to the backup. The backup process records all the messages 
sent by the primary. If the primary process fails, the backup becomes 
active and starts repeating the primary’s computations. During normal 
computations the primary and backup processes are synchronised.
This scheme is obviously limited to a single failure system. However the 
principle of messages being sent to a primary process and its backup can 
be expanded to allow multiple replicas. This is further discussed below.
A combination of the above approaches would lead to a solution to the fault- 
tolerance problem. Ideally the solution would provide both language support 
and transparent fault tolerance. FT-Linda [5] and Avalon/C++ [11] are both 
examples of existing languages augmented to support fault-tolerance.
13
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2.3 Atom ic Transactions
This section examines transactions. Though normally associated with the 
database field, this area is quite important for distributed systems. From this 
perspective, a transaction can be regard as an operation on the shared entity. 
For distributed share memory systems, this would be any operation which 
takes place on the shared memory. For message passing systems this would 
be any message sent to another process.
If an operation (transaction), when viewed externally, has no intermediate 
states, it is said to be indivisible.
If all objects participating in a transaction can be restored to their initial state 
after a fault so tha t the transaction has no effect at all, it is said to have the 
property of recoverability. To achieve this property, all operations are applied 
to a copy of the object which was intended to receive the transaction. This 
copy is known as a version; if the transaction fails, the version is discarded. 
On success, the version is committed to stable storage. This stable storage 
has a high resilience to faults and is accessible by all processes. Obviously 
there is a overhead in time and space for copying an object, applying changes 
to it and if the transactions do not fail, re-applying/copying the version as the 
new object. The versioning and locking of objects can be dealt w ith by the 
language runtime system.
A group of operations is atomic if it has the properties of indivisibility and 
recoverability [6]. This is an important definition as it allows multiple opera­
tions to be grouped together as if they were one atomic transaction, provided 
the group has the properties of indivisibility and recoverability.
Atomic transactions are applied to all functioning replicas or to none of them 
and are executed without interleaving at each replica. This guarantees that 
all replicas will execute the same set of instructions and the instructions in a
transactional set will be executed in the same order.
This guarantee allows the principle of process replication to work. Here, we
14
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use the premise tha t if you send the same instructions, in the same order to 
all the replicas of a process, running at different nodes, the state of all the 
replicas will be the same -  i.e. consistent. If this condition did not hold and if 
some replicas did not get the transaction, or they were executed in different 
orders, the replicas would have different states. If one of these conditions did 
not hold then the system would be in an inconsistent faulty state as no replica 
could be used as a replacement and its results could not be used in further 
interactions. This only holds true for transactions that are deterministic.
2.4 FT-Linda
The concurrent language Linda uses shared memory in the form of a tuple 
space(TS) as the entity which shared between different threads of execution. 
This is an associative access data store, i.e. data is addressable by content 
and not by address. Tuples placed within a TS are immutable: once the data 
has been placed in it cannot be changed (unless the specific remove request is 
applied). TS’s also have the inherit properties of temporal and spatial decou­
pling. Spatial decoupling means that a process does not have to know which 
processes it is communicating with. Temporal decoupling allows communi­
cating processes to exist at different times - the processes do not have to be 
concurrently active. These abstractions help enable Linda to be extended to 
provide fault tolerance.
Three fundamental operations exist for tuple spaces: out, in  and rd . o u t 
is an asynchronous operation th a t deposits tuples into the TS; in extracts 
tuples based on a template (it can also be used for synchronisation); rd is like 
in but does not remove the tuple from the TS. Asynchronous versions of in  
and rd exist; they are inp and rdp respectively.
Linda [2] is a language that lends itself quite easily to transparent fault tol­
erance. As all of the current state of the system is maintained in controlled 
access tuple spaces, the issue of what to replicate and when to log changes
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is simplified. FT-Linda [5] extends the basic Linda language and runtime 
environment to facilitate an effective fault-tolerant system using a DSM ar­
chitecture.
These extensions have been designed to allow the convenient implementation 
of fault tolerant systems and the cost of execution kept to a minimum [5].
The values of volatile memory can written to stable memory (e.g. to disk). 
Alternatively, if the values are to be shared across multiple nodes, the values
can be replicated onto multiple nodes.
A number of issues are involved when using a distributed shared memory 
(DSM) model to provide fault tolerance. The tuple space of Linda is essen­
tially a DSM component. A number of these issues are examined in the paper 
Distributed Shared Memory: A Survey of Issues and Algorithms [17] and these 
should be taken into account when a DSM system is designed. The structure 
and granularity must be defined. The structure describes the semantics of 
the bytes in memory -  does a particular memory location refer to an ‘integer’, 
a structured type or a particular programming language’s ‘object’?
Granularity describes the size of the unit of sharing; for example, this can be 
a byte, word, page or data structure. The larger the shared memory segment, 
the less “paging” overhead occurs; however, having large shared “pages” may 
cause contention between different processes.
The next issue with designing a DSM system is that of the coherence seman­
tics of the memory. This addresses the issue of when local nodes update their 
local copies of the shared memory.
Fortunately, the Linda language itself can help in providing solutions for the 
implementation of the DSM. The structure and granularity issues are ad­
dressed by the tuple space concept of Linda.
By this use of stable tuple spaces and atomically executing actions, fault tol­
erance can be achieved in Linda. If commands are deterministic and are exe­
cuted atomically with respect to concurrent access, the state variables of each
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replica will remain consistent [5].
Bakken and Schlichting [5] describe another way in which to ensure fault 
tolerance in Linda programs is the “bag of tasks” approach [5]. Here, the tuple 
space is filled with tasks that must be carried out; when a process wants to 
execute a task, it marks it as “in progress” space and also places a breakdown 
of what needs to be done. It will then begin to execute these sub-tasks. If at 
any time failure occurs, the work can easily be carried on.
There are some restrictions placed on FT-Linda. The guard of atomic guarded 
statements (AGS) may block, the body cannot. This is in place to prevent 
deadlock. All tuple space operations m ust be part of the AGS.
The first restriction is quite awkward from a programming perspective. In 
the body of the AGS, all the re a d  and in  (and their variants) tuple space 
operations must reference existing tuples, if not an exception is raised and 
the program terminated. Thus the programmer must ensure tha t all refer­
ences to tuple spaces are placed as part of the guard in the AGS. This adds 
an implicit overhead onto the runtime system. For example, the programmer 
must insert a rd into the guard for a tuple that it is not concerned with at 
the current execution point. Then while doing computation in the body, the 
rd is reissued, the result may different from the guard’s rd  because previous 
operations in the body may have changed the value.This adds unnecessary 
network communications and programmer burden. This is one of the prob­
lems of adding a feature onto a language that does not intrinsically support 
it.
F ig u re  2.1 Linda example
i n(firstVal, tv all) 
in (nextVal, ?val2) 
out(result, plus(wa/l, val2))
Figure 2.1 shows an example of a simple Linda program fragment which 
reads two values from the tuple space, adds them together and deposits the
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result back into the tuple space. The statement: in(firstVal,?vall) reads 
the value from the tuple with key firstVal into the local variable vail. Simi­
larly, val2 obtains its value from the tuple with the key nextVal. The values 
are added together and deposited into the tuple space into the record with 
key result. In order to implement this in FT-Linda, the statements m ust be 
rewritten in AGS form. The guard of the AGS is formed by performing the two 
in  statements. The body of the AGS would be the out statem ent as in Fig­
ure 2.1. This approach requires the programmer to think about what parts 
of the program must be made fault tolerant. As this is done manually, some 
error may occur because the AGS structure is invalid.
Figure 2.2 FT-Linda example (user error)
( in (firstV al, 'ivall) ==>
in(nextVal, lval2) 
ovLt(result,plus(vall,val2)) )
Figure 2.2 shows an incorrect approach to implementing the above Linda code 
as FT-Linda. An AGS is denoted between the angle brackets (between the ‘(’ 
and ')’); the guard occurs before the the body comprises the statements 
from the to the ‘)\ The body contains an in  statement, which causes the 
Linda runtime to block the process until the requested tuple is present; how­
ever, with FT-Linda, this will cause a runtime error, as the body is not allowed 
to block. The approach taken by FT-Linda requires the programmer to sepa­
rate parts of the application as being non-fault tolerant and those being fault 
tolerant. It is open to user error which can produce inconsistent and non-fault 
tolerant systems. The programmer is also required to adjust the normal flow 
of statements and “protect” against faults explicitly, by dividing the program 
into AGS’s. A correct approach is shown in Figure 2.3. This requires issuing 
two AGS’s, one of which contains a null body to ensure that the inoperation 
is fault-tolerant. Clearly this is intrusive for the programmer.
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Figure 2.3 FT-Linda example -  rewritten
( in (firs tV al, Ivall) =$■ ; /* null body */ )
( in(nextVal, ?val2)
out(result,plus(vall,val2)) )
2.5 The SPROC Approach
Following on from the above primitives for distributing memory, a higher level 
construct can be used to model fault recovery. This is the approach taken by 
FT-Linda [5] based on the model proposed by Schneider [18].
Schneider identifies, three types of objects which exist in a distributed system 
-  the client, server and output device. A client requests a service from the 
server. The server provides this service. The output (or result) from the server 
may go to the output device (which could be the client). 2
Though Schneider only considers a client-server approach to distributed com­
puting, his model for fault tolerance can be applied to other distributed sys­
tems as well. Consider the client as the issuer of a request to a rproc (a request 
procssor) -  the server in Schneider’s model.
Schneider [18] proposes a state machine approach to fault-tolerance. In this 
model, a state machine is a process with state, an sproc. In the model, the 
rprocs are replicated and co-ordination is provided between the interaction of 
issuers and the rproc replicas. The issuer only deals with one rproc, but the 
propagation of its invocations must be directed to all the replicas of th a t rproc.
Though Schneider refers to his model as the state machine approach to fault 
tolerance, do not tha t this not a true state machine from a Computer Science 
perspective. This is a process that at a particular point in time has ’state’. 
This state is the value of its instance (local) variables. Hence we refer to this
2These are relative term s, referring only to the type of transaction  occurring.
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model as th e  SPROC model.
One can think of a SPROC as a rproc, in that it has issuers (clients). The 
relationship between a SPROC and its issuers can be summarised as: a SPROC 
implements procedures and a issuer’s requests are procedure calls. The issuer 
making a request is not blocked while tha t request is processed as its output 
(result) can be sent anywhere.
The outputs of a SPROC are completely determined b y  the sequence o f  re­
quests it processes -  they are independent of time and any other activity in 
the system.
A SPROC consists of state variables and commands (requests invoked b y  is­
suers). The state variables encode the SPROC ’s state; the commands trans­
form its state. A command must be deterministic and atomic. This leads to 
an immediate limitation to the type of objects that can be considered as valid 
SPR O C ’s. How can replication be provided for non-deterministic rprocs?
This limitation can be overcome by a number of different approaches. One 
such approach is to re-engineer the rproc so it only reacts to external events, 
thus all internal, general, events are deterministic. The portion of the rproc 
that causes this non-determinism, is made an issuer of the rproc. Thus it just 
invokes on the exposed services. These can easily be propagated to the other 
replicas. An exposed service is an interface element which client can invoke. 
An example of this is a communication channel in Ada or an operation in SR.
Another approach requires the language to recognise the non-deterministic 
portions. This is not always possible semantically, but perhaps a language 
syntax can be introduced to indicate non-deterministic portions.
The following assumptions can be made about SPROC requests: Requests are 
processed in a first-in first-out manner, i.e. the order in which they were 
issued. If a request r made to a SPROC s by issuer c causes r' to be made by d 
to s  then r is processed before r'. These two rules are quite obvious for SPR O C’s 
that exist in a non-replicated environment, where one issuer issues requests 
to a SPROC it is obvious that the request r will be processed by the SPROC
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before r \  However when replicas are involved, we need to ensure that this 
holds as each replica may be processing requests at different rates than any 
of its peers. A situation could arise where a r’ request could be received before 
a r. That is why it is important tha t order is preserved. The assumptions thus 
ensure that r will be processed before r \ In other words, these assumptions 
do not imply th a t a SPROC will process requests in the order received, but the 
relative ordering of the messages will be preserved.
A system can be defined as being t-fault tolerant if the following holds true:
“a system is t-fault tolerant i f  it satisfies its specification provided 
no more than t o f the software components become faulty ” [18]
One of the ways in which to achieve this type of fault tolerance is through the 
use of replication. For this scheme to operate correctly, replica co-ordination 
must be used.
Replica co-ordination ensures all replicas receive and process the same se­
quence of requests. There are a number of ways to implement this: agreement 
and orderis one method. They allow requests into an ensemble (a set of repli­
cas for a particular SPROC ) to be fully disseminated.
Agreement ensures tha t every non-faulty SPROC replica receives every re­
quest. And order ensures that non-faulty SPROC replicas process the requests 
received in the same relative order.
Agreement governs the behaviour of an issuer interacting with SPROC repli­
cas; ordering governs the behaviour of SPROC replicas with respect to replica 
co-ordination [18].
In order to satisfy agreement, a transm itting process sends out a value, this 
value must be the same as all other non-faulty processes in the transm itter’s 
replica set. If this transm itter is non-faulty, then the value used by the recip­
ient processes is the one agreed on above.
In the context of a client-server invocation, a client issues a request. This 
request will contain parameter values. The client send the request to the
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server, which deals with it. Since we are operating in a replicated environ­
ment, n client replicas each issue the request to the m server replicas. At a 
given server replica process, rrii, it receives n request, from the client replica 
set. To satisfy agreement, all the messages, from non-faulty replicas, must 
contain the same values for the parameters and operation identifier.
Order is satisfied by assigning a unique identifier (uid) to a request and have 
each replica process the requests in a total ordering relation. The replica 
process the request with the smallest uid.
More details about the issues replica co-ordination, agreement and order are 
described in more detail in Schneider [18].
Schneider’s model deals primarily with SPROC replication, however this does 
not insure against faulty issuers or faulty output devices. It is not always 
possible to replicate issuers for a variety of reasons. The application seman­
tics may not support it or there may not be enough resources. If this is the 
case, the system must be designed in such a way as to minimise effects from 
a faulty issuer. This may involve designing the S P R O C ’s that interact with 
these issuers to only allow certain commands th a t can be performed on it. 
These may be simple commands that do not give access to major state space 
areas to the clients -  e.g. restrict the amount of memory that an issuer can 
write into. Another approach is to build tests into the commands to ensure 
the validity of the issuer. This has obvious performance drawbacks.
In the cases where the issuer can be replicated, the SPROC can be modified 
to deal with all its replicas [18]. This however is quite intrusive and does not 
integrate with the generally clean model of Schneider’s model which has the 
goal of transparent fault tolerance for all system components.
Dealing with faulty outputs requires the establishment of a voter. One must 
first make the distinction between outputs being used inside the system or 
outside.
If the outputs from a SPROC are going to be used outside of the system then 
a critical voter is used. It waits for t +  1 votes (fail stop) or 2t + 1 (Byzantine
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Failures). A majority is chosen if all the votes do not agree. The voter is 
external to the system.
When the outputs are used internally to the system, the voter is part of the 
output device (say the client). It is faulty when its host process is. The voter 
adopts a different strategy outputs used internally by the system. The voter 
waits for t + 1 identical votes from different replicas for Byzantine Failures; 
for fail stop, execution can proceed when any output is received.
Faults are detected by configurators. Each configurator is responsible for the 
detection of failure or the repair of the object it manages. One configurator ex­
ists for each object in the system. For fail stop failures, the configurator needs 
only to check the failure detection mechanism of its managed object. However, 
with Byzantine Failures, it is not always possible for the detection of failures. 
A greater degree of fault tolerance can be achieved by reconfiguration.
2.6 Configuration M anagem ent
According to Schneider [18] the state of a set of rprocs, issuers, output devices 
and all their replicas must be maintained. This is done typically in a sys­
tem repository SPROC . Whenever an object (rproc, issuer, output device or a 
replica) is added or removed, that changed is mirrored in the relevant set.
These sets are usually changed when an object is replaced by the fault detec­
tion and recovery mechanism. The values of the different sets m ust be given 
to the issuers and output devices. This may be done on a demand basis, where 
the issuer polls the system SPROC for changes. Alternatively, on every request 
sent to the issuer or output device, the system attaches state-change informa­
tion. This scheme requires periodic communication with the issuer/output 
device.
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2.7 R econfiguration
Another param eter to be taken into account for an active system is the num­
ber of failures tha t can be tolerated before the t fault tolerant condition is 
invalidated.
One way to ensure the more than t faults can be tolerated is to allow the re­
placement of faulty processes. The runtime system of a language must recon­
figure the set of objects to accommodate failure. This may involve removing 
the faulty process and replacing it with a correctly functioning one. Replacing 
a process requires the replaced process to have the same state as the failed 
one before it can become an active member of the current configuration. Thus 
one can have a system continually running tha t is fault tolerant by replacing 
the faulty objects. This leads to the Com bining Condition [18] shown in 
Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 The Combining Condition
P( r) — F(t) > enuf V r  > =  0
if Byzantine Failures are expectedenuf - < 0 if fail stop
where:
P(t) represents total number of processors at
time r  tha t are executing replicas of some
SPROC o f  in te r e s t
F(r) the number of faulty replicas
As the number of failures increase, F(r) increases, causing P ( t ) — F(t) to de­
crease. Under Byzantine failure conditions, removing a faulty process from 
the replica set decreases enuf without further decreasing P ( t ) — F(t). How­
ever, it is not always possible to identify Byzantine failures.
Under fail stop conditions, increasing the number of non-faulty process is the 
only way to ensure the condition remains valid. This is done by dynamically
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creating new process as others fail. As this has the effect of increasing P(r), 
this keeps P(r) -  F(r) from falling below 0.
This condition must be valid at any time during the life of the system in order 
for the system to remain non-faulty and produce the correct output.
To ensure this, under Byzantine conditions, removing a faulty process does 
not invalidate P(r) -  F(t ). Under fail stop, ju s t increasing the number of 
non-faulty processes helps to ensure the Combining Condition holds.
When replacing a faulty object, it must added to the ensemble of replicas 
before the condition is invalidated. Maintaining these last two constraints 
will ensure a greater than r  fault tolerant system. These constraints govern 
the rates at which failures and repairs can occur.
Performance issues may be another motivation for the removal of faulty pro­
cesses. With some systems, the number of messages sent is proportional to the 
number of SPROC replicas that m ust agree on its contents. This agreement 
protocol may be dependent on the number of faulty processes.
The Combining Condition is one of the rules which must be kept valid during 
the lifetime of a fault-tolerant distributed application. It governs the number 
of replicas which must be active to ensure the application keeps going.
2.8 Identifying Failed P rocesses U sing Time
One of the approaches taken when identifying a failed process is to use time­
outs. If a replica does not reply to a request by the time the timeout has 
expired, it is marked as faulty.
The problem with timeouts is tha t a process can fail without doing anything. 
In the paper “Using Time Instead of Timeout for Fault-Tolerant Distributed 
Systems”, Lamport [14] presents an alternative approach for identifying faulty 
processes. The paper presents a distributed executive effecting the runtime 
environment of a process, as well as network constraints.
25
2.8. IDENTIFYING FAILED PROCESSES USING TIME
Lamport [14] argues that each component and event involved in a distributed 
system m ust have an upper bound time applied to it. Thus the time a remote 
invocation takes comprises of the transmission time and remote processing 
time. It must be possible to calculate these times, so to apply Lamport’s ideas, 
each layer of a distributed system must be able to perform tasks in a timely, 
predictable manner. This allows reliable timing information to be extracted.
In his system, a process processes events. When an event occurs, it m ust be 
processed, an output and reply generated. The constant 5 is defined as:
5 is the time taken by process % to handle the event, and send the 
reply to process j.
Thus 5 is comprised o f :
1. The time needed to process an event and generate a message;
2. The time needed to transm it the message across the communication 
medium
One important requirement is tha t a process can determine the immediate 
source of any message it receives.
Using this approach, failure occurs when node i does not receive a response 
from j  after 26 seconds, this gives the system sufficient time (5) to process the 
event a t i and then at the receiving node j.
Since this system is dealing with absolute time, the clocks of the different 
nodes need to be periodically synchronised. At any time the clocks of non- 
faulty processes must differ by at most e seconds.
Using the above assumptions, the following proposition can be defined:
A message arrives at node j  from i at time T  + 5 + e, where T  is the 
time when process i has received the event.
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Assuming a nonfaulty communication link between i and j, and provided j  
is nonfaulty, then the message received by j  will be the one sent by i. This 
message will have a timestamp of T, th a t is it arrived at i a t time T. Node j  
receives the message after i has processed it and after it has been transmitted 
by the network, this takes a time of 5 seconds.
One of the properties required for a network in a fault-tolerant environment 
is the ability to support broadcast. This is the mechanism used by process to 
communicate with their replicas. Lamport initially presents the processes in 
his fault-tolerant distributed environment as receiving all events [14]. When 
a message is sent by node i, it is broadcast to all the nodes in the environment. 
This approach allows all the nodes to respond to the event and thus keep their 
local state up-to-date.
The following condition is imposed on the broadcast mechanism of the under­
lying network: If process i broadcasts a message at time T  on its clock then:
1. If * is nonfaulty then every nonfaulty process j  receives the message by 
time T + A o n  its clock, for some constant A;
2. If j  and j ' are nonfaulty then both of them receives the same message by 
time T + A on their clock, or neither of them receives a message at time 
T + A on their clock.
A major constraint requires that for any node i wishing to communicate with 
node j, there exists at least one path in the network of nodes for this to be 
accomplished. The greater the number of paths tha t exist, the more tolerant 
the network. Under fail stop conditions, to tolerate /  failures, there must 
exist /  -hi paths. For arbitrary failures 2 / + 1 paths are required.
Another important constraint th a t Lamport has placed on the network is that 
of bounded delivery times. It can be deduced from the network the time it will 
take to transm it a message. Obviously this is not a property held by all net­
works but some do support this, time-sliced [23] networks used in airplanes 
for example. With these networks, a node is scheduled to read from and write
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to the network at a fixed time. No other nodes will be reading from or writing 
to the network while another has access.
Each node is running the same state machine which is waiting for events to 
arrive. When an event arrives, it is processed. Events are processed every 
clock tick. For a clock with a resolution of one nanosecond, this produces a 
billion events every second. Lamport [14] makes the assumption that most 
events are NULL events; tha t is nothing is sent and these events require no 
processing. Executing an event may change the state of the process. Once 
all the events received at time T have been processed, then the timeaction 
command is processed. This is a special command tha t manages the timeout 
actions.
Using the above formulas for event handling, the timeaction can easily com­
pare the current time to calculated values of detecting when a node has failed. 
So it can compare if the current time, T  against oldtime+6+A to see if a failure 
has occurred, and then take the appropriate recovery steps.
Figure 2.5 Distributed Executive main loop 
REPEAT
FOR j  := 1 to iV ->• 
execute Event 
END FOR
execute timeaction
generate my own command and broadcast to all other processors
clock := clock + 1 
FOREVER
The distributed executive sits in a loop executing the code in Figure 2.5.
This idea of all the nodes executing the same code and receiving the same 
messages is quite similar to tha t of Schneider [18]. However, Lamport [14] 
acknowledges tha t the amount of fault tolerance required by a particular ap­
plication should be configurable. As all these features have their cost, some
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can be omitted. This makes the system less tolerant to faults but it will per­
form better. For example, if we rule out Byzantine failures, then only /  + 1 
connection paths are required for /  failures as opposed to 2 / + 1.
2.9 A chieving Consensus
Turek et al. present a description of the type of distributed systems that 
can achieve consensus and the conditions required for consensus [24]. These 
describe the limits of what can and cannot be done to achieve fault tolerance.
Consensus is an important topic, as it is the part of the distributed application 
and system tha t decides which value(s) to use as a result of all the input 
received from the various replicated processes. If the wrong value is chosen, 
or a value cannot be decided, the system will lose its validity and correctness. 
This will cause it to degenerate, at best, and produce invalid and, incorrect 
output at worst.
Three cases are identified as allowing consensus to be achieved:
1. Processes are synchronous and communication time is bounded.
2. Messages are ordered and the transmission mechanism is broadcast 
(The processes can be asynchronous or synchronous).
3. Processors are synchronous and messages are ordered.
Also presented is the result that states tha t consensus cannot be achieved in 
a synchronous distributed system if one-third of the processes are maliciously 
faulty.
Interestingly, the Byzantine Generals Problem[ 15] can be solved if the net­
work supports broadcast (all nodes can ’hear’ what is being said) and authen­
tication is supported [24,15]. Authentication is required because each replica
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needs to be able to verify th a t the replica which says it sent a message actu­
ally did. Under Byzantine conditions, replicas can impersonate other replicas 
by using another replica’s messaging identification and not its own.
Authentication need not be required to solve the Byzantine Generals, as a 
solution exists if there are 3t +  1 nodes present and each node has 2t + 1 
connections to other nodes, where t is the number of supported failures. The 
condition on the number of connections is to avoid network partitions.
2.10 Conclusion
With the exception of a few implementers (e.g. Schneider [18]), many of 
the early authors researching into the incorporation of fault tolerance into a 
distributed system have referred to the narrow definition of a fault as a total 
failure, or only dealt with one failing component, the processor (computer). 
However many other types of failure can occur; dealing with fail stop seems 
to be the simplest.
One of the problems with the SPROC approach [18] is th a t of overhead. Each 
request must be broadcast to every replica, and acknowledgements must be 
received before the client can resume. In a busy network environment, this is 
unacceptable.
The SPROC approach does not deal with non-determinism. This, too, is a seri­
ous shortcoming. Many application areas rely on non-determinism and by not 
addressing this a large number of applications cannot support fault tolerance.
There are two elements to building systems which provide fault tolerance. It 
must possible to detect faults and, after a  fault has occurred, recover from 
faults. Fault detection requires the use of time and voting to achieve con­
sensus to check if an entity has failed. Fault recovery requires that mecha­
nisms exist tha t allow the replacement of faulty entities with ones that are 
not faulty. A replacement must be in the provide the same functionality the 
entity being replaced.
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These mechanisms need to be provided for software failure, hardware failure 
and network failure. Replication is the mechanism to use for handling soft­
ware and hardware failure. Replicas of a software process are run at different 
nodes (i.e. different computers) than the original process. Strictly speaking, 
the process replica can be running on the same node as the original process, 
but in the face of hardware failure, this may not be wise. In the implementa­
tion done in this thesis, there is not main process, but a process group consists 
of a set of active process replicas. When a replica is detected as failed, it can be 
replaced (‘hot-swapped’) with another which has the same state as the failed 
replica. It is up to the distibuted executive if a failed replica is replaced at the 
time of failure, the main concern is to ensure th a t the Combing Condition  
is valid.
A network may provide alternative routes to transm it a message from one 
replica to another. So if one route becomes faulty, there are others which 
may be taken. These mechanisms allow a distributed system to recover from 
network failure.
The network layer must provide a lot of functionality to enable fully fault 
tolerant systems to be built. It must be possible to obtain different routes 
between replicas, broadcasting must be possible and it m ust be possible to 
predict message transmission times. The reason for this requirement is to al­
low bounding of message transmission times so the system can detect failure 
of the network or replica. Obviously not all networks provide these features. 
To support recovery from Byzantine failures, authentication m ust exist in ad­
dition to the above requirements from the network.
It is possible to build fault tolerant systems th a t do not posses all the prop­
erties listed in the chapter. However, this comes at a cost. For example, if 
authentication is not present the offered solution will not provide recovery 
in the face of Byzantine failures. Similarly, if message transmission times 
cannot be predicted, then alternative mechanisms m ust be built into the dis­
tributed executive to allow detection of a failed node. For this type of network, 
the distributed executive may use a timeout value to indicate tha t a replica
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has failed if it has not sent a message before the timeout expires. As Lam­
port [14] states, this means a replica can be marked as failed by not doing 
anything. It may be the case that the replica is running on a machine tha t is 
busy and it takes longer to produce a message.
The aim of this thesis is to provide an environment which support transparent 
fault tolerance. By incorporating the mechanisms discussed and applying 
them to a language a system can be produced which allows developers to focus 
on their application and not on fault-tolerance. The ftdlsystem will provide 
this.
The following chapter evaluates existing process models, sychronisation and 
replication alternatives. By evaluating this work, a new model will be pro­
posed to enable the development transparent fault tolerance systems. This 
model and its fault-tolerance approach is based on a hybrid approach of cur­
rently existing systems.
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Chapter 3
Supporting Fault Tolerance
3.1 Fault Tolerance Im plem entation Strategies
This chapter presents the current approaches to enabling fault tolerance in 
distributed systems. In order to provide this facility, we need to select a pro­
cess model and an implementation language as the interface between the user 
and the system. The process model describes which distributed entities are 
replicated, how they interact to detect failure and how failure recovery can oc­
cur. The implementation language and the operating system are part of the 
user’s tools for implementing a fault tolerant system. A number of options ex­
ist for providing fault tolerance: using libraries, extending a language, devis­
ing a separate language or using a combination of these. The ideas presented 
in the previous chapter are expanded for implementing such systems.
Selecting a process model is important as it determines the synchronisation 
primitives and the semantics on what entities are to be made fault tolerant. 
Two different approaches are examined -  Distributed Shared Memory (DSM) 
and Message Passing (MP)1. The former requires the data of the system to be 
replicated, the latter requires the inter-node transactions to be replicated. 
Synchronisation is an important aspect in distributed systems as this the 
manner in which the entities coordinate their activities and exchange data. 
XMP usually occurs between communicating processes
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Following an examination of the different process models, a host language 
needs to be found to support the chosen model. One approach examined 
extends an existing language to provide fault tolerance through a combina­
tion of libraries and language syntax extensions. The system presented is 
Avalon/C++ [11] which has extended a non-distributed language. An exten­
sion to Linda, FT-Linda [5], which supports fault tolerance is also presented. 
These two base languages differ in their support for distributed computing. 
C++ [21] does not support distributed concepts whereas Linda supports dis­
tributed concepts from its inception.
Any language extension must respect the philosophy of the language and any 
additional extensions must be added in a clean manner. The advantages of 
extending an existing language are many fold. The major one is the user 
base. Many people already know how to use the language and by adding 
fault tolerance, it allows the familiar language to be used in building fault- 
tolerant applications. It is however difficult to add features to a language that 
are not built into it from the beginning. Both the Avalon/C++ and FT-Linda 
extensions have shown this.
When designing a distributed process model, the language interface needs 
to be constrained and parameters set. For example, when designing a lan­
guage, is it better to allow the dynamic creation of processes at runtime, or to 
fix them at the compile time state, as in OCCAM? The main requirement is 
the ability to replace faulty replicas dynamically at runtime. As this feature 
will be present in the language runtime, ftdl(Fault Tolerant Distributed Lan- 
guage)will expose this to the user to allow a dynamic process creation model.
The first part of this chapter attempts to select a process model for use in 
our implementation. This is done by examining a couple of existing models. 
The next part presents the alternatives for the implementation language ap­
proach. Namely, do we extend a language or create a new one? Finally, the 
chosen approach is described.
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3.2 P rocess Model
There exists a number of ways to express the distribution of a system. Two 
such approaches are examined here -  DSM and communicating processes. 
The key difference between the two approaches is the type of structure to be 
distributed. With DSM, it is memory or memory objects which are the units 
of distribution; processes communicate and sychronise resources through this 
memory. Message Passing systems, also known as “communicating processes”, 
communicate through shared communication channels. Communication prim­
itives exist which allow the communicating processes to interact with one 
another. The DSM model distributes data. The message passing model dis­
tributes messages, which can be instructions, data or requests.
3.2.1 D istributed  Shared M em ory A pproaches
DSM can offer ease of programming over the message passing model; pro­
grammers are able to work with familiar constructs. This model sits at a 
higher level than message passing and frees the programmer from the send 
and receive message paradigm. The distributed entity -  shared memory -  
can be accessed and used almost transparently in existing code. Code can be 
ported quite easily from a sequential model. However, this may not be a good 
thing, in some cases, the distinction between remote and local objects m ust be 
made — for example, for synchronisation and performance issues.
MP requires the programmer to partition data and manage communicating 
values, which may not be the actual form of the data to be transm itted [3].
Nitzberg [17] claims that the overhead associated with DSM systems is small, 
or ‘reasonably small’. This however depends on the design and implementa­
tion strategy. For example, some DSM systems flood the network with many 
update messages when a write m ust take place.
DSM systems can be implemented using hardware, operating system, library 
implementations, or compiler implementations. The hardware approach ex­
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tends traditional caching to that of a distributed system. Operating system 
and library facilities have been implemented using virtual memory manage­
ment mechanisms. Compiler implementations map the shared memory ac­
cesses to the corresponding synchronisation and coherence primitives.
The design of a DSM system requires a definition of the memory layout and 
selecting the granularity of the shared components. The data (memory) held 
in the DSM can be unstructured or structured. Unstructured memory is seen 
as an array of bytes. Different forms of structure can be placed on the mem­
ory. The stored data can correspond to an object, some other data type in the 
system. This may represent a tuple (database record) as in Linda [5].
The next issue which must be addressed when designing a DSM system is the 
granularity, i.e. the unit of sharing. The shared memory is partitioned into 
pages. Each page is of fixed size and contains the data. If the granularity 
is high, false aliasing occurs. This phenomenon occurs when two unrelated 
portions of shared data are contained in the same page. If page size is too low 
then a lot of thrashing/paging overhead is introduced [17, 3],
Excessive data transfers can cause certain implementations of DSM systems 
to exhibit the ‘Ping-Pong’ effect. Say we have two processors Pi and P2, both 
accessing the same page. Further, Pi and P2 are part of a process iterating 
through the data on this page, for example updating the values of a shared 
array. Pi writes to the page, and in doing so, P2’s page is now invalid. So an 
invalidate message is sent to P2; P2 then gets the updated page. Now P2 is 
going to write to the page, thus making P i’s copy invalid, and an exchange 
occurs. This can be reduced by better use of synchronisation and picking 
a different memory consistency model. For example, if Pi got a mutex on 
the array, iterated through it and changed the values and then released the 
mutex, much less data will be exchanged and performance will be increased.
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Caching and Memory Consistency
Many DSM systems implement some sort of caching strategy, similar to tha t 
of virtual memory systems found in operating systems. At each node, a copy 
of a few pages of the global memory are kept; when a page fault occurs, the 
required pages are brought into this cache. This (distributed) memory, when 
mapped into the local address space, must be protected. The local DSM m an­
ager m ust be made aware of any read s  or w r i te s  tha t take place. This can 
be achieved by using the host operating system’s memory management API 
to m ark certain memory regions to be protected - whenever access is made, a 
notice is sent to the program. Many DSM implementations replicate the data.
Since there may be many copies of a shared object, a consistency model m ust 
be found which keeps the data in a correct and consistent state -  i.e. a consis­
tency model defines the expected memory behaviour of the system [3]. This 
model must minimise on network communications, as this will inhibit the 
performance and scalability of the system. It m ust avoid the Ping-Pong effect 
and false sharing failings.
Ideally, strict consistency can be defined as: whenever a re a d  operation takes 
place on the shared data, the most recently written value is returned [17], 
‘Most recently’ is a very ambiguous term, but alternatives exist: entry consis­
tency, lazy release consistency and sequential consistency.
Sequential consistency works by sending an invalidate message to all repli­
cas whenever a w r i te  is made on a shared object. This requires them to 
update their pages. With Release consistency, messages are sent at every 
synchronisation point, lazy release consistency sends the update message af­
ter a lock release. This message is sent to the next lock that is acquired on 
the page. However, more management overhead is needed as all other subse­
quent locks must be brought up to date before receiving the most current data 
value. Other forms of the lazy consistency model exist; the entry consistency 
is also a lazy model. Here, all shared data objects have a synchronisation ob­
ject associated with them (this differs from the previous models, where pages
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are shared and not the object). Whenever this is requested, the data for the 
object is made consistent. Lazy models have less message exchanges than 
their alternatives [3].
Consistency can be used with synchronisation to ensure local caches are kept 
up-to-date. Synchronisation is very much implementation dependent. Th- 
readmarks[ 3] provides both a means of locking portions of shared data and of 
rendezvous. Its rendezvous mechanism is known as a barrier and is used to 
synchronise all existing processes at the barrier. Rendezvous is the term  used 
to describe multiple process which must meet (synchronise) a t a specific point, 
a barrier is a similar notion. Each barrier has a unique ID; the purpose is to 
allow all processes executing up to the barrier to synchronise their shared 
pages. This is a slightly different reason for allowing such a feature, but it 
help Threadmarks system to keep the cache of pages up to date. A more 
typical use to allow communicating processes to sychronise their execution 
points. Applying this to process replicas is a way to allow all the replicas of 
a process to synchronise at a specific point. When the barrier is reached by 
all the replicas they can exchange data, perhaps to synchronise the values of 
their local variables.
Portability of DSM Systems
An advantage of DSM, as championed by their implementers, is the ease of 
portability. Programs written on single machine/non-shared memory archi­
tectures can be easily ported to take advantage of distributed systems [3, 17]. 
However, there are a lot of differences between single-process programs and 
distributed ones. One must be able to control what each process does, where 
it is located, how it communicates with the outside world, how it synchro­
nises data and state. Synchronisation is not transparent in DSM systems, it 
must be built on top of them. Programmers may be able to share data, but 
the manner in which it is controlled -  e.g. locks — is implementation depen­
dent. Programs must acquire the shared data, and in another step, acquire
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the locking or synchronisation mechanism and somehow tie them together. 
An exception to this is, of course, Linda [5].
Linda has the advantage th a t it is temporal and location independent. Its 
processes do not care where the processes they are communicating with are 
located, or if they are still in existence. All it is doing is acting on data, and 
may place the output back into its global shared memory for other processes 
to work on. When data is to be changed, it must be removed from the tuple 
space and then replaced. If another processes requires it, it is blocked until 
the first puts it back. It is a very elegant and powerful DSM system. However, 
like with other distributed shared memory based systems, we are dealing 
with raw data. Applications must be suited to work within the tuple based 
paradigm.
3.2.2 C om m unicating P rocesses
An alternative to DSM is using communicating remote processes. Here, we 
have many independent processes -  each running in parallel with the others. 
Communication between them is achieved through message passing [8]. Some 
languages, like Ada [7] and SR [4], abstract this explicit message passing into 
the language. Rendezvous is established by using synchronous r e c e iv e  and 
send  primitives [4]. This is based loosely on Hoare’s CSP model where in­
dividual sequential processes would synchronise through the send  and r e ­
c e iv e  primitives. In CSP both the sender and receiver have to be named. 
This is not as flexible as the scheme offered by Ada [8] and SR [4] where only 
the sender specifies the receiver’s name. Linda, because its a shared mem­
ory system, goes a step further: the user does not have to specify either. On 
the receiver side, an a c c e p t statem ent is executed to wait until data arrives 
from a given channel (in Linda this is the in  operation). This provides an 
decoupling between clients and servers in Linda.
In SR, rendezvous is done by issuing a c a l l  from the sender; the receiver uses 
the r e c e iv e  statement (alternatively, the in  statem ent can be used). This
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is analogous to the message passing structure of CSP, but note th a t semi- 
synchronous Interprocess communication (IPC) can be used. By issuing a 
send call, a remote process is started, while allowing the calling process to 
continue execution. This is like forking another processes [4] in UNIX.
SR is very expressive in terms of the various synchronisation and communica­
tion models that are accommodated: Remote Procedure Call, Message Passing 
Rendezvous and Dynamic Process Creation. Coupled with these various mod­
els, each have many options; the in  command can prioritise the m anner in 
which it deals with incoming requests. Also, these parameters can utilise the 
arguments of the request.
3.3 Fault Tolerance -  D etection  and R ecovery
In order to enable fault tolerance, the distributed system m ust be able to de­
tect failures and subsequently recover from them. Replication of data, or pro­
cesses, enables a system to recover from failures. DSM systems and message 
passing systems are architecturally different, but combinations of their fea­
tures can help produce a process model tha t provides efficient fault detection 
and recovery.
Like fault tolerance, DSM requires replication. As the DSM system is already 
tracking data changes, getting it to propagate the data changes to yet another 
copy (i.e. the replica) of the shared memory is not a major issue. DSM sys­
tems replicate the shared memory at different nodes. The problem arises in 
the detection of faults. This can be done by the co-operation of the different 
DSM managers at each node; a lot of the data can be stored in the global 
shared memory itself. Recovery, however, is more of a problem. What is to 
be done if not all the expected processes deposit their intended values in the 
shared tuple space due to failure? Deadlock can occur. Consider the Linda ex­
ample shown in Figure 3.1. There are three processes executing concurrently. 
Process A writes into the tuple space the tuple (“Checkpoint”, TR U E). The
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processes B and C are blocked waiting for that tuple to be deposited into the 
tuple space. 2 Once that tuple is deposited, processes B and C can continue 
executing. If, however, Process A becomes faulty before it deposits the tuple, 
then B and C will be blocked forever.
F ig u re  3.1 Linda Example
Process A: o u t {“Checkpoint”, TRUE)
Process B: r d {“Checkpoint”, ?boolean_value) 
Process C: rd  {“Checkpoint”, ?boolean_value)
The synchronisation model is built onto the DSM system through the shared 
memory manipulation primitives. This does not lead to a very natural way 
of working. These systems, by definition, rely on raw data, not higher level 
entities of objects or processes.
Replication for communicating processes is slightly more complex than for 
DSM. DSM has replication built-in. For a system consisting of communicating 
processes, we need to propagate state change messages to the replicas. The 
best m anner to determine state changes is at compile time from the source 
code itself. Consider the following fragment of code:
X : = y + 3 ;
This sets the value of the local variable x to the sum of the value of the local 
variable y and the constant 3. The result of this expression, when executed, is 
a new value for x. This is an example of a state change of the process in which 
x is the local variable. Clearly when compiling this fragment, the compiler 
sees tha t this expression causes a state change. This is one advantage of 
having access to the compilation phase of a program — most state changes can 
be noted.
2The L inda command rd is a blocking command which w aits for the  expected tuple to be 
deposited. Unlike the out command, i t  does not remove the tuple from the tup le  space.
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When a fault occurs, the runtime system of the language needs to redirect all 
communications to the faulty process to one of the replicas. This is the act of 
replacing a faulty replica with a non-faulty one. The problem is like that of 
replacing a faulty DSM node with a new clean copy.
Checking for faulty memory in a DSM system is a challenge. This may require 
application based code which integrates a consistency checker (for all network 
copies) and the user code that checks if the values are meaningful.
Another issue mentioned in the DSM research is tha t of replica updates. 
Many of the earlier systems used broadcast to update them, but it does not 
scale well [17]. As there may be many hundreds or possibly thousands of 
nodes, broadcasting to all and awaiting acknowledgement is not feasible. A 
multicast protocol or something less traffic heavy should be employed as an 
alternative.
3.4 Selecting a P rocess Model
For fault-tolerance in a communicating processes system, outgoing messages 
between processes should be propagated to all replicas. Determining if a mes­
sage will change the state of a process can be best noted at compile time; 
however, the type of messages propagated may not be deterministic. Here, 
the data of the message can vary from each replica. This variance can result 
from valid sensor readings, or different random numbers being generated. 
Consider sensor readings, the replicated processes may be attached to differ­
ent sensors, monitoring the same entity. Due to differences in calibration, 
the time when they are read or other external factors, the values from any 
two sensors may differ. The processes attached to the sensors may read from 
them at slightly different times, within nanoseconds of one another, and there 
may be a small difference in result. For example, if the tem perature of a room 
is being measured, one sensor may read 20.1 while the other reads 20.09. 
This data does not differ by much and may be in an acceptable range for the
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application. Thus these values need to be encoded in any transfers as being 
a non-deterministic, it can be considered as fragile — its value is not perma­
nent and may differ between readings from sensor to sensor. When the fault 
checker is invoked, these absolute values are not compared using their abso­
lute values, but they are checked against the other values to ensure there is 
not great difference between any two values.
These stochastic elements may comprise some parts of the message. So it may 
not be a m atter of transm itting all state change messages to the replicas, a 
two-tiered approach may need to be adopted to identify or isolate the non- 
deterministic elements: a copy of every message is sent to the replicas, when 
the data is modified, the change is noted as occurring from a deterministic 
source, or a non-deterministic source. The result is then propagated.
Figure 3.2 Identifying deterministic/non-deterministic data modifications
Process P —>
private Array a; 
op DoSomething( Param ) —>
for counter = 1 to a.size
a[counter] := Param * RandomNumber(); 
endfor
sy n ch ro n isa tio n  p o in t
endop
endproc
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example situation. In this case, the DoSomething 
operation is non-deterministic. The local variable a is updated using a ran­
dom number generated on every iteration of the loop. This is the non-deterministic 
element of this process. It may be better to update the replicas after the for 
loop has taken place — i.e. the non-deterministic part is finished. The Thread- 
Marks system [3] calls such points barriers. Each barrier has a unique in­
teger identifier. Every process that contains the barrier call will wait until 
all the other processes have read it — a type of multiple rendezvous. When
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all processes reach these barriers, the data pages are updated. Something 
similar should occur for the data replication of the fault-tolerance algorithm 
that will be used. The data sent and used by other processes in the system 
— the shared data -  should be encoded into deterministic components and 
non-deterministic components.
There are a couple of reasons for synchronising after the f o r  loop. In the 
example, the shared entity is the array a. If the replicas were to synchronise 
at every iteration of the loop, a lot of messages would be exchanged based on 
the number of elements in the array, a . s iz e .  Exchanging state after the loop 
has completed, reduces the number of messages from a . s iz e  to one. This 
message would contain a . s i z e  elements. Secondly, if state was updated at 
each iteration, there is a danger that a process could become faulty during 
the loop. This could leave the shared array in an inconsistent state as it 
would contain partially valid values from a defunct process. Traditional DSM 
systems would update at every data change, i.e. every iteration. A solution 
to this could be to have the user insert explicit synchronisation points. While 
this is a valid way of solving the problem, it does not address the issues fully, 
as it open to user error. These sort of state changes can easily be noted by a 
compiler, which can generate the synchronisation code.
A similar problem exists for other forms of non-determinism. How do the 
replicas of a process agree on the action to be taken when non-determinism 
occurs? Tough this is beyond the scope of this work, let us examine one pos­
sible solution. Consider a situation when a process is executing a guarded 
command and more than one guard becomes valid. One of these will be se­
lected non-deterministically. Somehow all the replicas need to agree on which 
guard should be executed. One possible solution, when a non-deterministic 
event occurs, is to have each replica notify the others which action it has se­
lected. When all the replicas have notified the others of their intention, a vote 
is taken, this will determine which action will be performed by all the repli­
cas. Clearly this approach has significant performance implications and is not 
suitable for all situations.
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3.5 Proposed Process Model
In this thesis a hybrid solution is proposed as the implementation strategy 
for the process model. Let the replicated units be the data contained in the 
processes; this is what will be changed by clients and internal operations. All 
state changing operations must be known at compile time so tha t they can 
be correctly propagated to the replicas. The synchronisation used should be 
flexible to allow multiple rendezvous as well as being non-intrusive at the 
programming model. The proposition is to use communication channels, as in 
Ada and SR, providing (synchronous) message passing, RPC and rendezvous 
capabilities, while a distributed shared memory approach is adopted for stor­
ing the state of a process. The DSM element is hidden from the users; they 
program to the communicating channels model. The DSM aspect is used by 
the executive for synchronisation of replicas.
One of the main differences between the suggested process model and exist­
ing implementations is the use of replicas and state. Both the DSM approach 
and Lamport’s [14] approach have all the data of the system replicated at ev­
ery node. The approach adopted by ffdl is to replicate the process (and their 
state) at nodes which comprise the replica group. All the replicas in a replica 
group coordinate their values and communication to ensure their data in­
tegrity. Thus communications only need to be transm itted to all the replicas 
in a replica group, not to all the nodes. Other systems broadcast this data 
and all nodes in the system process the event, updating their local replicas. 
Replication is used as a locality of reference and not to support fault tolerance.
The local variables of a process comprise the shared data of the replicas. The 
granularity of replication is the set of process local variables. This data can 
be changed through the use of incoming data on a process’s communication 
channel or through normal program execution -  i.e. data is changed not as a 
result of any communication. An interesting optimisation can be performed 
by the compiler. It can check if a remote invocation will cause a determin­
istic change; if it will, there is no need to synchronise after the invocation
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as all replicas will perform the same deterministic invocation. However, if 
the call is non-deterministic then the changed data needs to be synchronised. 
The DSM approach is used when transferring state; state transfers occur at 
checkpoints (such as after the fo r  loop in Figure 3.2). Other communications 
use a modified SPROC /message passing mechanism.
Using this hybrid approach, when the processes synchronise, the language 
runtime system can update the replicas. This update scheme will need to 
be used in conjunction with updating the processes as well. The m anner in 
which replicas are updated will vary with the type of computation. For exam­
ple, non-deterministic or time intensive portions should only be updated after 
the main processing is complete; other updates may just require forwarding 
the change request to the replica. This model also works without processes ex­
changing communications. Consider a system comprised of one process, this 
is not distributed, as only one process exists and it performs all computations 
locally, without the need to interact with remote processes. The ftdl model 
still allows for replication of this process, with all state updates occurring at 
the correct points.
3.6 Fault Tolerance Through Language E xten­
sion
This section examines current approaches it extending existing languages to 
develop fault-tolerant systems. The design goals for any extensions to a lan­
guage must provide enough functionality to allow fault-tolerance while try­
ing to keep the cost associated with this to a minimum [5]. There should 
be little intrusion into the language’s programming model and these exten­
sions should respect the constraints and design of the language to ensure 
the added facilities are readily and easily adopted. Fundamental to the inter­
process transactions which take place is the integration of the host language’s 
process model (if it exists) with the required one for fault tolerance. If  the lan­
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guage does not support a process model, then one will need to be designed in 
addition to the fault tolerance extensions.
Extensions to two existing languages are presented in the following sections. 
Section 3.6.1 describes an enhancement of C++ programming language [21] 
and Section 3.6.2 presents an extension of Linda [2]. Both of these host lan­
guages differ considerably; C++ is designed to be a single process environ­
ment which can be extended by the use of libraries to provide facilities for 
inter-process support. Linda is designed to be a language which lends itself 
to distributed computing through its use of shared memory. The model for 
Linda to provide communication and interaction between processes through 
a shared memory.
3.6.1 Avalon/C++
Avalon/C++ [11] is an extension to C++ th a t uses a transaction based model 
of concurrency. The system is insulated from faults by using two-phase com­
mit protocols which each transaction. For non-database systems, where the 
execution of a set of operations is not arbitrary, the extra cost associated with 
these two-phase commit protocols is not required [5]. Avalon/C++ extends 
C++ through the use libraries and language extensions.
The following types of failure in a distributed system has been identified by 
Detlefs et al. [11]:
Local Storage Failure. Nodes can crash, maybe destroying local storage. 
Thus local storage is not a reliable medium.
Comm unication Failure. Communications can fail because of lost 
messages or network partitions.
According to Detlefs et al. [11], processes can reside in three types of stor­
age: volatile, non-volatile and stable. Volatile storage can be thought of as 
the main memory of a machine; non-volatile is the local hard disk/persistent
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store. This store too can be subject to failure. Stable storage has a high prob­
ability of surviving crashes and other failures. An example of this could be 
replicated data throughout a distributed system. Logging each transaction 
that modifies a recoverable object to a stable store allows all the transactions 
to be ‘re-played’ to a new process [11]. This allows the new process to have the 
same state as the failed one, prior to the failure.
Crashes themselves can be divided into two classes -  node and media failures. 
A media failure will destroy both volatile and non-volatile storage. A node 
failure will only destroy volatile. This is the more common of the two.
The write-ahead logging protocol can optimise recovery from node failures. 
The virtual memory pages containing the object are p inned  into volatile 
memory; they cannot be returned unless they are unpinned, which is after 
the object is modified. All the modifications are also logged to the stable store. 
This ensures against media failures. The p in  operation ensures th a t no half 
modified objects are returned to non-volatile storage. This is akin to removing 
a book from a shelf where no one else can access it until it is returned.
The usage of pinning/unpinning is much like that of m utual exclusion’s wait 
and signal: before data is modified the process waits for access to it. Once 
it has it, no other process can modify the locked object. When the modifying 
process is finished, signal is called. However, this synchronisation primi­
tive has many failings, one of which is the matching of waits and s ig n a ls . 
Another problem is that of recovery; if a process holding a mutex fails before 
it can signal that it is finished with the resources, deadlock can occur as 
subsequent processes will attempting to obtain the mutex tha t is locked by a 
failed process. This is a concern.
Components obtain the properties of serializability and crash recovery by in­
heritance. The authors state tha t these systems must satisfy application- 
defendant consistency: i.e. applications must provide their own serialise and 
recovery methods. This is one aspect where extending an existing language 
leads to compromises. It is much more difficult for the application program­
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mer to keep track of how to serialise and how to recover from crashes than 
the actual runtime system of the language itself.
Transactions are sequential processes which are:
Atomic. This gives transactions the ability to be serializable (transactions 
appear to execute in a serial order).
Transaction consistent. A transaction either succeeds completely and com­
mits, i.e. aborts and has no effect.
Persistent. Effect of transactions survive failures.
Transaction semantics are provided by atomic objects. Atomic objects ensure 
serializability, consistency and persistence. A transaction has a unique par­
ent, a set of siblings (possibly empty) and sets of ancestors and descendants. 
A transaction can be considered its own ancestor or descendant. Transactions 
can be nested. Aborting in a parent rolls back a committed child’s changes. 
The effects of a transaction only become permanent once a commit takes place 
at the top level.
An application in Avalon/C++ is made up of servers. Each server is made up 
of a set of objects which export the available operations of the server. Objects 
in a server can be stable or volatile. However, guaranteeing atomicity may be 
expensive, so those objects which require it can be so designated.
The communication between processes is done by invocations of operations 
of a process. Avalon/C++ receives its transaction management, IPC, commit 
protocols and atomic crash recovery from the operating system (OS).
Im plem entation
To allow the application fault tolerance, the developer must use inheritance to 
provide the functionality to those objects which are identified as critical and 
required to be fault tolerant.
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1. recoverab le . Provides primitives to ensure persistence. This imple­
ments the write-ahead logging protocol defined above, re c o v e ra b le  is 
a class defined in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 recoverable class declaration
class recoverable{ public:
virtual void pin( int size_to_pin ); 
virtual void unpin( int size_to_pin );} ;
Whenever a recoverable object is modified, the p inn ing  statem ent is 
used. This is an extension to C++ used by Avalon.
Consider the example: there exists a class CustomerTable which is a 
recoverable list of customers. Figure 3.4 contains the code.
This method is clearly very intrusive to the implementers. It is an added 
task which m ust be done in normal implementations. A lot of the fault- 
tolerance strategy is exposed to the programmer and this method of im­
plementing pin() and unpin() can easily cause errors - what happens if 
all the data members of an object are not pinned? The advantage to this 
approach is tha t the programmer decides what is to be deemed recover­
able, and what is not.
2. atom ic. Derived from recoverable and provides primitives for atom­
icity in terms of read and write locking.
Locking ensures serializability. Obtaining a read or write lock may sus­
pend the calling process until holding processes are finished their trans­
actions. While a read_lock is held, a requester for a write lock will be 
suspended until all the read and write locks are released for th a t object. 
This type of behaviour can lead to deadlock - where two or more pro­
cesses are waiting for the other to release its lock. Locks are obtained by 
calling the respective methods of the atomic class in Figure 3.5.
Using this approach, the user must partition the processes into readers 
and writers. It is thus not a general solution.
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Figure 3.4 Avalon/C++ CustomerTable Example
class CustomerTable : public recoverable{public:
// ctors, dtor omitted for clarity
//AddNewCust( Customer & );
virtual void pin( int size to pin );
virtual void unpin( int size to pin );
private:
DataStorelmplementation CustStore;
} ;
CustomerTable::AddNewCust(Customer& NewCust) { // The following is equivalent to:
// pin( sizeof(*this) );
// CustStore.Add( NewCust );
// unpin( sizeof(*this) );
//pinning(this);
CustStore.Add(NewCust);
}
void CustomerTable::pin( int size_to__pin ){ recoverable::pin( size_to_pin );
// forall data members -> pin()/ /
CustStore.pin(sizeof(CustStore));}
void CustomerTable::unpin( int size_to_pin ) { recoverable::unpin(size_to_pin); 
CustStore.unpin(sizeof(CustStore));}
3. subatomic. Derived from recoverable. Like atomic but offers finer- 
grained control over synchronisation and recovery. This type has been 
provide to enable higher levels of concurrency and efficient recovery for 
more complex types. To this end both ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ syn­
chronisation is provided. Short-term provides operation consistency and 
mutual exclusion between concurrent accesses (e.g. using semaphores or 
monitors); whereas long-term will ensure that the effects of transactions 
are serializable. The subatomic class is shown in figure 3.6.
Every subatomic object contains a short-term lock which can only be held 
by one transaction at a time. Avalon/C++ has extended C++ by adding 
a when construct. This is like a conditional critical region; the calling
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Figure 3.5 atom ic class
class atomic : public recoverable{
public:
virtual void write_lock(); 
virtual void read_lock();
} ;
Figure 3.6 subatomic class
class subatomic : public recoverable {
protected:
// These implement short term synchronisation 
// and object consistency 
void seize(); 
void release();
void pause(); // release lock, wait a bit,
// obtain lock
private:
// The following are for transactional consistency 
// These functions are NOT called directly by the 
// user but by the runtime system when necessary/ /virtual void commit( trans_id& ); 
virtual void abort( trans_id& );} ;
process calls seize to obtain the lock and release when finished . The 
language guarantees that no partial effects will be observed if failure 
occurs while in the when construct.
3.6.2 FT-Linda
FT-Linda is an extension to the Linda programming environment which pro­
vides for the construction of fault tolerant systems. There are two potential 
problems in Linda that have been identified after a failure has occurred: lost 
tuples and duplicate tuples [5]. Both of these are symptoms of the lack of suffi­
cient atomicity in Linda. Lost tuples come from incomplete update operations. 
The tuple is first removed from the TS and then immediately deposited with 
the new value:
in(“Var”, 10) (i)
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out(“Var”, 20) (ii)
If the process fails between (i) and (ii), the tuple will have been removed from 
the TS; whenever subsequent reads from another process occur, they will be 
indefinitely blocked. Ideally the update operation should be a single atomic 
command.
The duplicate tuple problem lies in the bag-of-tasks model of programming. 
Under this scheme, a task tuple is taken from TS and a worker process, from 
a set of worker processes will take the first available task. If as a result of this 
task, subsequent tasks are generated, these too are placed into the TS. Clearly 
this may also suffer the lost tuple problem; but even if a solution existed, there 
is a danger that a worker will fail while it has not fully completed its task. 
Worse, it may have deposited some of its results. When another worker gets 
the uncompleted task(i.e. the one tha t failed), it will also generate some of 
the tuples already in the TS. This is the duplicate tuple problem.
Fault tolerance can be added to Linda by providing a stable TS and provid­
ing better support for the atomicity of TS operations. From [11] we see tha t 
truly stable storage must survive node and communication failures. To this 
end, stable TS’s are implemented using the SPROC approach [18] by repli­
cating the TS’s across different nodes. Each replica is updated using atomic 
multicast. The TS operations are disseminated together in a single multicast 
message to all replicas. The message will then be executed in the serial order 
dictated by its contents. This method is relatively simple to implement as 
well as reducing the number of messages when compared to the transactional 
approach. Atomic multicast guarantees ( [18, 5]) that if the commands sent to 
a SPROC are deterministic and executed atomically with respect to concurrent 
access, the state of the SPROCs will remain consistent.
The extension to Linda as described by Bakken and Schlichting [5] is a good 
example of integrating fault tolerance neatly and well into the host language. 
This is a good approach as the new features added can be easily adopted by 
users of the language. The limitations of this enhancement are tha t only
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fail-stop faults are recognised and arbitrary or Byzantine failures are not tol­
erated.
3.6.3 P ossib le E nhancem ents to FT-Linda
Many distributed languages use channels as a means of communication with 
remote processes; instead of using that method, shared distributed memory 
should also be investigated. This has the advantage th a t changes can be eas­
ily tracked and the data exposed would be core operational data. Using this 
with a variant FT-Linda’s private tuple space may help to provide better re­
covery mechanisms.
As all the data a process is working on is in its private TS then, if it faults, 
another process can be brought in and given the private data.
Another reason for mentioning distributed shared memory support is that 
some applications may require it instead of, or with, the standard network 
(communication channel) method.
When data is changed in a process/shared memory region, a distributed call­
back facility would be a welcome addition. This would remove the require­
ment tha t polling must be done, or that each application m ust supply its own 
m anner of doing so. The callback can be on data change notifications, data 
request notifications or any user defined event. For example, whenever the 
price of stock changes, all processes interested it will be notified.
3.7 A rchitecture of Selected System
This section describes the implementation approach adopted to enable fault- 
tolerance for this work. All the elements which comprise a distributed ap­
plication must be made fault-tolerant but current systems only provide fault 
tolerance at the language and runtime levels.
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The following constitutes a typical architecture for a distributed environment: 
user code, interface to distributed executive, distributed environment execu­
tive and network layer interface.
At the programming level, the user enters a statem ent to invoke an operation 
on a remote entity:
R E M O T E . R E F  . O P  ( P A R A M l , ■ ■ •,  P A R A M J l )
Here, the operation “op” is being invoked on the remote object “remotejref”, 
taking n parameters.
The compiler translates this simple statement into a series of interactions 
with the distributed executive, as well as producing the normal outputs from 
a compiler (e.g. generated machine code). For this operation to reach the 
remote node, it needs to be converted into a message. This contains at least 
the destination identity (i.e. the recipient) of the message and each param eter 
of the operation.
Each parameter needs to be inserted into the body of the message. This is one
of the tasks of the interface to the executive.
Once the message has been constructed at this high level, it must become a 
network message, that the network layer can use to deliver it. Close collab­
oration is required between the executive and the network layer interface.
Some communication protocols require the route from source to destination to 
be set-up in advance or alternatively the network layer may actually construct 
this route.
Once the message has been converted into something tha t the network layer 
can understand, it is transm itted to the remote node. Analogous actions take 
place at the destination node as on the sender when the message is received.
On receipt of the message, the network layer removes the network informa­
tion and passes the new message to the distributed executive. Some protocols
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Figure 3.7 Traditional distributed application architecture
remote_ref.op(parami,...,paramn) RCV op(PI,...,Pn)
will authenticate the sender of the message at this stage, using only the sender 
for the security references. Other security schemes will do this authentication 
at the executive level.
The executive m ust now decide which of its entities is the recipient of this 
message. It then passes it to tha t entity.
The executive interface code will take this message, extract each param eter 
and then passes control to the user code.
The receiver issues the following statem ent to indicate to the executive that 
it is waiting for a message on its communication port named o p  :
RCV op (P i,  • ■ •, Pn)
In order to support fault-tolerance, each of these components need to be mod­
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ified. As we will show, it is vital for compile time information to be gathered 
and passed on to the runtime environment to allow for fault recoverability. 
Figure 3.7 shows this interaction. This figure depicts a traditional but non­
fault tolerant architecture.
3.7.1 F ortifying the N etw ork
The network layer is primarily concerned with routing a message to its des­
tination. Lamport [14] notes that for the communication layer to be fault 
tolerant, it must establish various alternate paths to destination nodes. As no 
direct link may exist between a sender and its recipient, the communication 
protocol may use intermediate nodes in order to ensure that the message ar­
rives at its destination. This allows the following two conclusions to be made 
about the sending a message from node i to j  :
1. Process j  receives a message with the timestamp T  at time T + n5 + e 
on its clock, where n is the number of nodes the message m ust be routed 
through to transm it the message, 5 the processing time required at each 
node to process the message and e, the greatest value tha t the clocks in 
the system can differ.
2. Define 7  as the path from node i to j ,  containing the intermediary nodes 
Jfco.Jfci.Jba,..., kn-i- If all the process and communication links on the path 
7  are nonfaulty then the message sent is the one sent by node i.
This second point is very important. In order to be able to recover from Byzan­
tine failures, we need to know which node has sent a message. If the network 
can guarantee supplying the originator of the message, it can help in guarding 
against Byzantine failures. Authentication is required because each replica 
needs to be able to verify tha t the replica which says it sent a message actu­
ally did. Under Byzantine conditions, replicas can impersonate other replicas 
by using another replica’s messaging identification and not its own.
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Another requirement of the network is tha t as long as there is some connec­
tion between any two nodes, the network can guarantee tha t the message will 
be delivered.
The network layer can ensure that transmissions and routing of messages 
is nonfaulty, while the executive and language interface can ensure tha t the 
messages themselves are not faulty.
3.7.2 D etectin g  Failure
The executive can check the originator of the message. For example, this 
information can be used to check if that node is in its suspected faulty list. 
It can store the message until it has a sufficient number in a cache in order 
to check the integrity of all the messages sent by replicas against each other. 
This is the main mechanism for fault inspection.
An important component in detecting failures is ensuring that the parameters 
of the message are correct. The newly received message will have its parame­
ters extracted and checked against the others in the cache. At the user coding 
level, there should be no need to worry about fault handling.
The executive also has the responsibility for dealing with failures. It m ust 
evaluate the options it has when failure occurs. This can include reconfigura­
tion and new replica activation [14, 18]. It must coordinate its activities with 
the other non-faulty nodes.
3.8 The Im plem entation M odel
Many languages have tried to add-on support for fault tolerance after the lan­
guage has been defined. Though this is possible, it does not yield an efficient 
solution, only compromises [21]. Both FT-Linda [5] and Avalon/C++ [11] a t­
tempt this.
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Avalon/C++ does this through inheritance of different objects -  a to m ic  for 
example. But this approach does not provide transparent access to fault tol­
erance. It is dealing with a much lower level, the transaction level. As [18] 
showed, dealing with faults must be done at the system level, and left to the 
runtime portion of the language. This allows transparent detection and re­
covery.
Though many implementations deal with the syntax of new language fea­
tures, a protocol m ust be established for the accurate detection of faults and 
how transparent system recovery can be managed.
By examining current approaches to providing fault tolerance, this chapter 
has produced a model for a language and environment to support fault toler­
ance. One of the things shown by the literature is th a t extending an existing 
language to provide fault tolerance does not result in a solution th a t is eas­
ily implementable or provides transparent failure detection and recovery. As 
a result, a separate language has been developed which provides the ability 
to develop fault tolerant distributed applications. This language is known as 
the Fault Tolerant Distributed Language (ftdl). It is a basic language which 
provides a limited set of features. This is used as an illustration of what is 
required in a language for fault tolerance: it must have a notion of distributed 
entities and communications with those entities, ftdlcomprises of a language 
grammar, compiler and a runtime support environment. The combination of 
language and runtime into one package allows for effective fault tolerance, as 
will be shown in subsequent chapters.
The process model of ftdl supports a message passing architecture between 
communicating processes. Transmission of messages requires the sender to 
indicate the process in the network which will receive the message. All trans­
missions carry the identifier of the sender, to allow authentication. This model 
has been selected as it supports the addition of replicas and the formation of 
replica sets quite easily. Currently, only synchronous message passing is sup­
ported.
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The runtime system support is an extension of the capabilities of Schnei­
der’s [18] SPROC approach and FT-Linda[5]. The network model is based on 
Lamport [14] and Schneider [18]. ftdladopts a different replication model. 
Both Schneider [18] and Lamport [14] expect all the nodes in the system to 
hold replicas for each process. Lamport [14] does allow his model to run  repli­
cas on a subset of the nodes, but this is does not change the general approach. 
These tend to provide fault tolerance easily for applications th a t work on a 
shared-memory principal, like the FT-Linda [5]. All the nodes in the system 
contain their own state, this gets altered based on messages received from the 
network. An implied uniformity exists between clients and servers.
ftdl supports an independent runtime model. Each replica is an independent 
entity. Clients must explicitly obtain references to (remote) servers for invo­
cations. The invocation parameters are propagated to the correct replicas, but 
each must process it differently and then dispatch the results. The replica­
tion and group communication is an extension to the distributed model and 
we use those entities to provide the fault tolerance. This allows replication 
of potentially computation intensive processes to be done across different m a­
chines. Our model, however, introduces a significant overhead in communica­
tion times.
The following chapters describe the design and implementation of our fault- 
tolerant simulation. We begin by describing the simple language which was 
created to describe the components required by a compiler, the generated (ob­
ject) code and the language runtime interfaces required to produce a system 
th a t supports fault tolerance and can recover from failure.
The sections which follow describe the impact on the distributed executive 
(using the inputs from the compiled code) and the network itself.
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Chapter 4
A Language and E nvironm ent 
for Provid ing Fault-Tolerant 
D istributed System s
The distributed architecture described in Chapter 3 has been implemented. 
This implementation is presented here as the f t d l  environment. The f t d l  im­
plementation consists of a simple programming language, a compiler, a sim­
ulation machine and a runtime system. The language is small, but sufficient 
to provide the necessary requirements for a language which supports fault 
tolerance. A runtime system has been written which implements the process 
model described in the previous chapter.
In order to measure the effectiveness of the proposed model, a simulation 
machine was created. This machine has a limited instruction set, that is 
interpreted by the code generated by the f t d l  compiler. This machine is inte­
grated into the simulator. This simulator provides an environment for mul­
tiple virtual distributed nodes to exist. These nodes represent the nodes in 
the network on which the distributed application is run. They are, however, 
run within the same simulation envrionment which is run as a single process. 
The f t d l  runtime system interfaces with this simulator.
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4.1 Language O verview
The language implemented illustrates the key requirements for fault toler­
ance and uses features of CSP [13] and SR [4]. The user declares a protocol. 
This protocol contains communication channels which is its interface. These 
channels are used by clients to communicate with the protocol.
In ftdl model, the implementation of a protocol lives in a process, tha t is, it can 
be said tha t a process implements a protocol. Clients send messages to other 
processes via the communication channels defined in the protocol. A protocol 
is thus an interface to a process’s functionality. The current implementation 
maps every protocol definition to a process.Messages refer to network mes­
sages sent amongst processes. A message is a  formated sequence of bytes. 
The term  operation refers to the communication channel declared in the pro­
tocol definition.
Figure 4.1 A Protocol Declaration in ftdl 
T i m e r  P r o t o c o l  —»
s t a r t  : Integer
s t o p  ( i d  : Integer)
d e l t a  ( i d  : Integer) : Real
end T i m e r P r o t o c o l
Users invoke operations on a protocol implementation, the language runtime 
converts these operation into messages which are sent communication chan­
nels. The terms message and communication channel are artifacts of the net­
work layer, whereas operation and protocol are terms belonging to the lan­
guage programming model.
Figure 4.1 declares a protocol for a simple timer. A tim er is created by in­
voking the s t a r t  operation, this returns a tim er identification which must 
be used in subsequent operations. The s to p  operation stops the idth timer; 
d e l t a  returns the lapsed time between s t a r t  and s t o p  operations.
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The operations declared in a protocol can be implemented as asynchronous 
procedures, running concurrently with other processes, or they can be used 
as static, synchronous ‘pipes’ from which data is read, and results sent down. 
The model presented here concentrates on the synchronous features.
4.1.1 L anguage D escrip tion  
Variable Types and Operations
ftdl supports the following primitive types shown in Table 4.1. In addition, 
the user can declare a reference to a protocol. This reference is used to com­
municate with the remote protocol implementation.
Data Type Description Sample Value(s)
Integer Signed integral type. 
Range: from —2147483647 
to 2147483648
- 1 , 2 0 0 0 1
Real Signed Floating point type. 
Range: from ±3.4028234xl038 
to ±1.40239846xl0-45
1 .5 ,-2 4 5 .5 6 7 7 8
Char Simple ASCII character type '  A '
String Sequence of characters forming a 
string of fixed length
' ' A S T R I N G ' '
Table 4.1: Primitive types supported by ftdl
Local variables and parameters are declared by giving the name of the in­
stance followed by a colon and its type.
The following is declarator of an integer local variable called l o c a l  : 
l o c a l  : Integer
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For protocols, the declaration is the same but the type name is the name of the 
protocol. For the TimerProtocol example given in  Figure 4.1, a local variable 
l o c a l _r e f  is declared like th is:
l o c a l  . r e f  : TimerProtocol
The return  type of an operation declared in a protocol is given after the chan­
nel name:
A N - O P E R A T I O N : I N T E G E R  ( i )
A N - O P E R A T I O N  ( A . P A R A M E T E R  : S T R I N G )  : I N T E G E R  ( i i )
Declaration( i) declares the operation a n . o p e r a t i o n  which does not take 
any parameters, but does re tu rn  an integer, (ii) declares an operation tha t 
requires a String parameter and also returns an integer.
The language supports the arithmetic and Boolean expressions shown in Ta­
ble 4.2.
Expression Type O peration
Boolean and, o r  and not
Arithmetic addition(+), subtraction(-), 
multiplication^) and divisioni/)
Table 4.2: Supported operations
Protocol D eclaration and Usage
A protocol declaration consists of the protocol name followed by an optional 
list of its supported operations. This declaration defines the type of messages 
an implementation can receive and the expected reply from the operation. 
Figure 4.1 gives an example of a protocol declaration.
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Once a protocol has been declared, an implementation m ust be provided. An 
implementation for a protocol m ust be of the form:
define p ro to co l-n a m e
implementation statements
end p ro to co l-n a m e
Every protocol implementation needs a unique name. This name allows 
clients to connect to this particular implementation. The name is assigned by 
the ID statem ent in the implementation process:
I D ( “ u n i q u e  i d e n t i f i e r ” )
A client specifies the implementation it wishes to use by passing an identifier 
string -  the same value as the one declared in the implementation -  to the Init 
operation for remote references:
a R e m o t e R e f e r e n c e  . Init ( “ u n i q u e  i d e n t i f i e r ” )
The runtime system will establish a connection from the client process to the 
implementation specified to the Init operation.
4.1.2 C ontrol S tatem ents
Control statements have been kept to a minimum. The ones provided are 
sufficient to implement most classes of problems. An IF statem ent and RE­
PEAT. .. UNTIL are supported.
The IF statem ent evaluates its predicate as a Boolean. If the predicate evalu­
ates to t ru e ,  then the body is executed. Otherwise, control passes to the first 
statem ent following the last statem ent of the IF block:
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IF predicate THEN
. . .  i f  body . . .
The REPEAT... UNTIL statem ent executes, sequentially, the body of the REPEAT un­
til the predicate of the UNTIL evaluates to true, a t which point control is trans­
ferred to the first statem ent following the UNTIL statement:
REPEAT
. . .  repeat body . . .
UNTIL predicate
4.1.3 D istribu ted  O perations
Remote invocations are performed by invoking on an operation of a protocol, 
using an initialised remote reference and passing the required parameters.
For n parameters a call has the form:
I N I T I A L I S E D R E F E R E N C E  . O P E R A T I O N N ( P A R A M I  , . . .  , P AR AMT C)  ;
An operation invocation not requiring param eters takes the form:
I n i t i a l i s e d R e f e r e n c e . O p e r a t i o n O ;
Operations which re tu rn  values can be assigned to local variables, just like 
normal arithmetic expressions.
An implementation indicates that it wishes to synchronously receive data on 
channel chan by using the receive statement, RCV:
RCVchan ( Pa r a m I ,  . . . ,  Pa r a m h ) ;
where P a r a m I ,  P a r a m 2 , . . . ,  P a r a m t t .  are locally declared variables. Th­
ese receive the values sent by the initiator.
Execution resumes after a remote invocation when the receiver issues a:
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RETURN chan R e t u r n V a l u e  ;
where R e t u r n V a l u e  is a locally declared variable. This value is passed back 
to the sender.
For operations tha t do not have return values, execution resumes immediately 
after the RCV on the receiver side. Effectively, operations th a t do not return 
values can be mapped to the statements shown in Figure 4.2 the receiver side:
F ig u re  4.2 Mapping of an operation which does not have a return a value
RCV no-return-chan maps to RCV no-return-chart]
RTN no-return-chan;
4.1.4 C om pilation
Protocols are declared and implemented in a text file. This file is used as 
input into the compiler f  t d l .  For example, to compile t e s t . d l, the following 
is command is issued:
% f t d l  t e s t . d l
This produces a g e n  file (with extension . g e n ) .  This is a formatted file which 
contains the simulation machine instructions to be executed. The format of 
the g e n  file is described in section 4.2. The g e n  file is used as input to the 
simulation machine, and is executed within tha t environment.
4.2 The Sim ulation Environm ent
The ftdl compiler produces a g e n  file. This is used as input to the simulator 
to set up a process. This process represents a node on the network.
The format of the file resembles the format of an operating system’s exe­
cutable. The first few bytes are used by the loader to set up the execution
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environment for the process. This is similar to an activation record for func­
tions as described by Aho, et al. [1] and Sorenson, et al [19].
Typically there is one protocol implementation per g e n  file. The main body 
of the implementation is preceded by setting up the stack for local variables. 
This requires the number of variables, their size and names (for ease of refer­
ence in the simulation).
Following the local variables on the stack, space is reserved for the communi­
cation channels. The names of the channels are in the file to aid usability in
the simulator environment.
As only synchronous operations are currently supported, the channels can be 
static entities; in an asynchronous environment a facility for having these as 
concurrent executing entities would be useful as in SR [4].
Following the channel area, the execution instructions are placed. The in­
struction set for the machine resembles simple assembly language. This is 
described in section 4.3.
4.3 Sim ulation M achine Instruction  Set
This section presents the instruction set for the machine used by ftdl. This 
machine exists within the simulator. It has the responsibilites of acting as a 
loader of an image into the simulator and sending events (timer and network) 
to the correct protocol. The image (code) is read from the g e n  file produced 
by the ftdl compiler. Following this section, the runtim e system and the sim­
ulation environment are presented.
The examples presented are shown as the ftdl source mapped to the machine 
instructions to they correspond.
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4.3.1 Standard Instructions
The standard instructions consist of arithmetic operations, Boolean opera­
tions, stack manipulation, comparison and flow control instructions. These 
are the type of instructions found in most languages, in one form or another. 
Table 4.3 contains the list of standard instructions, their runtime require­
ments and semantics.
4.3.2 E xecutive Interface In stru ction s
There are three dedicated instructions in our machine which provide an in­
terface to the distributed executive: send, receive and reply. When these are 
executed, the executive expects the stack and any marshaled buffers to be set 
up for use. The distributed executive is the portion of the overall runtime 
envrionement which simulated.
Sending a M essage
Recall that a SEND operation is performed when the user invokes an operation 
on a remote, initialised reference:
I n i t i a l i  s e d R e f e r e n c e  . S o m e C h a n n e l  ( p a r a m I  , , P a r a m t i )  ;
The generated code will push the values for paraml to paramn onto the stack, 
from left to right, in marshaled form. Following this, the name of the remote 
channel is put onto the stack -  in this case, S o m e C h a n n e l  -  and a reference 
to the remote protocol. This reference contains the information for the bind­
ing between the local node and the remote implementation, for example, the 
target address and route to the target.
Finally the SEND instruction is placed on the instruction stack. This requires 
a param eter indicating if the operation returns a value or not.
If a value is returned, it is pushed onto the data stack. Otherwise no value is 
pushed.
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Instruction Class Instruction Behavioural Notes
Boolean and Performs operation on top two 
stack values. Result placed on
or stack.ibid.
not ibid.
Arithmetic addition ibid
subtraction ibid.
m ultiplication ibid.
division ibid.
Comparison greater than ibid.
less than ibid.
equality ibid.
com pare Remove the topmost two val­
ues from the stack;
See if they are equal;
Push the boolean result onto 
the stack.
Control Flow branch if  true Branch to the address given as 
an argument if the top of the 
stack’s value is true; otherwise 
continue to the next instruc­
branch if  not true tion.inverse of above.
Stack
Manipulation push Place the argument of the oper­
ation onto the top of the stack.
pop Remove the topmost value from
move the stack.Remove the topmost value from 
the stack and place into the vari­
able indicated by the argument to 
this operation.
Table 4.3: Simulation Machine Standard Instruction Set
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When the runtime executes this instruction, it generates a message to be 
sent to the relevant set of replicas. It takes the marshaled data from the 
stack, appends it. This message contains the identifier for the implementation 
group (the string passed to the Init operation), the name of the operation and 
the marshaled parameters.
This message then filters through the remainder of the runtime system to be 
sent via the network. Execution does not resume until a reply message is 
returned from the destination.
R eceiving a M essage
An implementation issues a RECEIVE directive by supplying the channel from 
which it wishes to read data. The process is blocked until data is received, 
or the system fails. At system failure, the process’ execution is halted. The 
ffdlstatement is of the form:
RCV c h a n ( P a r a m I , . . . ,  P a r a m n ) ;
The identifiers Param 1 to Paramn are local variables of the protocol’s imple­
mentation. References (addresses) for these are placed onto the data stack. 
When the newly received message is propagated to the implementation from 
the runtime system, these variables are filled with the incoming data.
Like the SEND instruction, RCV requires a param eter indicating if a return 
value is expected (This is shown as an argument to the RCV machine instruc­
tion.) If one is not expected, once a successful receive is performed, a reply 
message is generated and sent back to the sender to allow it to resume execu­
tion. Otherwise, the reply is not sent back until a RTN instruction is encoun­
tered. The following section describes this instruction.
Replying to a M essage
There are two forms of the reply instruction, RTN. One is the explicit form, 
which the user uses to send the return value from an operation. The implicit
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from is generated by the compiler for operations tha t do not re tu rn  values. 
Figure 4.2 on Page 67 illustrates this latter form.
RETURN chan r e tu r n - e x p r e s s io n ;
The runtime will construct the reply message for the operation when the RTN 
instruction is encountered. The chan argument tells the runtime which chan­
nel is issuing the RTN. A return value is marshaled into the message if one is 
expected -  this an argument to the RCV instruction, described above.
4.4 The Runtim e System
The implementation of an ftdl protocol exists in one process. At execution 
time, the number of replicas to be is used is specified. Each replica is a process 
r u n n in g on it own machine, which is a node on the network. Each process 
which is a replica of a particular implementation is grouped together. This 
grouping is referred to as a replica group or replica set.
Fault tolerance is provided by the use of process replicas [6 , 18]. Each replica 
is assigned to a group. Each group consists of replicas all implementing the 
same protocol. Each replica grouping consists of a group name, derived from 
the protocol name, and a set of member nodes. This set is managed by the 
runtim e component, the C t x M g r  , which is local to every process.
The following sections detail the runtime architecture and interactions of an 
ftdlmachine. We will examine how the system identifies faulty processors 
and handles failures. The mechanics of distributed directives will also be ex­
plained. Also described in this is the workings of the runtime system. The 
next section describes a brief architectural overview, subsequent sections de­
scribe the major components, fault detection scheme and the fault handling 
procedure.
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4.4.1 Major C om ponents
Local Node Component Interactions
The distributed system consists of a set of interacting processes, running at 
different nodes (hosts), connected by a network. Each local process contains 
the program to execute, extracted from the g e n  file. This is coupled with an 
interpreter to execute the code.
Figure 4.3 The Runtime context component
From the g e n  file, tuple sets can be created. These sets are arranged into 
tuple spaces. We have two tuple spaces: one for the communication channels 
and the other for local variable storage. The communication channel tuple set 
contains the operation names declared for the protocol implementation in the 
source ftdl file, along with a special channel - _repl . This channel is used by 
recipients of SEND messages to place their replies. The code, interpreter, data 
stack, channel set and variable tuple space form part of the runtime interface 
artifact, referred to in section 3.7. This interface is known as the r u n t i m e  
c o n t e x t  . Figure 4.3 shows the major components of the runtime context.
The r u n t i m e  c o n t e x t  is the heart of an ftdl process. It drives the inter­
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preter, tha t is, gives it an execution context; dispatches remote invocations to 
the C t x M g r  ; routes incoming messages to the correct replica and feeds the 
data to the other components when requested.
The C t x M g r  , in collaboration with the this component, has the responsibility 
to identify potentially faulty replicas by semantically checking each invoca­
tion’s parameters from every participating replica involved in the transm is­
sion context. These checks compare the values of each parameter. The com­
parison must consider the fragility of the value, as described in Section 3.4 
and format of the value. The runtime system knows how to do the compari­
son as it uses information gathered from the g e n  file. All value comparisons 
are not always a simple case of examining a sequence of bytes but the format 
of the data must be considered. For example, if the values being compared is 
a reference to an protocol, what needs to be compared is the name of protocol 
implementation being used and ensuring tha t all the replicas are referring to 
the same one. r u n t i m e  c o n t e x t  and the C t x M g r  provide the functionality 
of the runtime layer, as described by section 3.7.
The C t x M g r  is concerned with dealing with other replicas. It manages the 
replica groups, identifies faulty replicas (in conjunction with the r u n t i m e  
c o n t e x t  component), manages incoming connections, provides reply m an­
agement and remote invocation delivery. One of its primary responsibilities 
is to provide a context in which remote operations take place. It creates and 
manages the contexts for sending data during an operation invocation, wait­
ing for data on a channel and issuing reply messages to all the replicas in the 
group.
Inter-Node Interactions 
R equest Identifiers and M anaging M essages
The C t x M g r  divides each replica set into two sub-sets:
1. Valid Replicas. These are the replicas tha t are non-faulty.
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2. Faulty Replicas. These are the replicas identified as being faulty; they 
are not used in subsequent transactions.
Let S represent the replica set, F  represent the faulty replicas, and K  the 
valid replicas. Define K  =  k0, k2, • • ■, /cn-i at time T. Define F = f 0, f 2, - ■ ■, f m- i-
Then (S = K  U F) A (K  n F = 0).
When a message from node i is sent to the n — 1 nodes in the valid replica set, 
its done as a specialised form of an atomic broadcast [18] to all the repli­
cas in that replica group; this is known as atomic multicast. Recall that 
Lamport[14], defines one of the properties of the broadcast algorithm to en­
sure tha t all non faulty processes in the replica set receive the message. This 
is also known as the agreem ent condition, imposed by Schneider [18].
Figure 4.5 Request identifier composition
Sending Protocol ID 
Destination Protocol ID 
Operation Name 
Occurance Point 
Iteration Value (optional)
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As the system only supports synchronous requests, transm itted by atomic 
multicast, order is not as much of an issue as in asynchronous systems [24]. 
The code generated by the ftdl compiler can provide a unique identification 
key for requests. This is composed of the sending protocol identifier, desti­
nation protocol identifier, the operation name and the occurance point of the 
request in the code. Each time a SEND instruction is encountered a counter 
is started, each subsequent occurance increments this number. The receiving 
process knows from the request identifier exactly which request this is for. 
Figure 4.5 shows the layout of the request identifier.
The message cache of the receiving CtxMgr keeps a queue for each expected 
occurance number for the given operation. The receiver protocol’s CtxMgr 
manages a special cache for messages. Each operation has its own queue, 
each operation’s queue contains sub-queues classified by the sending protocol. 
Each sending protocol queue also has a queue based on the occurance number 
described above.
If a SEND statem ent occurs within a loop, the occurance number is also subdi­
vided. It contains two portions -  the occurance point and an instance count, 
based on the number of times the loop has been executed. While the other 
identifier components are compile time entities, this last component is ob­
tained at runtime.
D eriving Failure from Time
Once the message has been multicast to all the non-faulty replicas in the 
process group, the sending process allows them time to process and issue the 
reply message. As Lamport[14] states, the required time to wait is determined 
by network latency, the number of replicas executing the code, generating the 
reply and delivering the reply.
If a process i issues sends a request at time T, and assuming tha t all process 
are executing at roughly the same rate, the non-faulty process j  will receive
the message at T + S, and can execute at the time Tproc, where Tproc = T +A  + e,
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for a network where delivery of multicast message takes the same time as 
delivering one message. TpT0C = T + (n—1) A+e for a network where a multicast 
message takes the sum of delivering a message to one node. In this equation, 
n is the number of non-faulty replicas in the group at time prior to T; A is 
network transmission constant and e is a constant. If process j  takes 5 seconds 
(at most) to process the event and to generate a reply, it will issue a reply at 
time Tproc + 5 + e, which will arrive at i at time Tproc +  5 + A + e. Call this 
time TarriVe. (These variables and equations have previously been defined in 
further detail in section 2 .8.)
If the processing is not carried out at a similar rate on all the nodes, an upper 
bound can be established to factor into the equations. Note that the generated 
code can calculate the value of 5 at compile time by measuring the amount of 
time it takes to execute the set of instructions when a protocol is dealing with 
the message on the operation channel. It thus computes a maximum time 
from all the channel processing times and issues that value, which can be 
used at runtime when determining the timing conditions and variables. This 
would be quite difficult to do if we did not have direct access to the compilation 
and machine language generation phases, so as to establish upper bounds on 
the execution times. These bounds become properties of an operation for the 
protocol.
With these equations, the process which issues a message can determine if 
a particular process has failed. This mechanism can only determine fail stop 
failures. Byzantine failures can be determined by checking each param eter 
of the message and by using the approach outlined by Tuerk et al. [24] and 
shown in the Literature Review  in section 2.9.
Comm unicating Processes
Communication between processes occur through their process groups. Mes­
sages sent from one process go to all the processes in the target process group. 
Consequently a SEND statement like:
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I n i t i a l i s e d R e f e r e n c e . S o m e O p ( P A R A M l  , . . . , P A R A M n )  ;
is issued from the node Pi} where P is the a protocol implementation replica 
set, i is the ¿th replica. Initially the replica set contains t replicas, where t is 
failure tolerance level. The system will be able to withstand t — 1 faults.
The SEND message is delivered from Pi to all the replicas in the target protocol 
set D. This is done through the atomic multicast feature discussed previously. 
The target protocol set initially contains t replicas. At time T, P  contains n 
nodes and D contains m.
When a destination node, D j  encounters its RCV statem ent -  for channel 
S o m e O p  -  it m ust wait for n SEND messages, one from each node in P. Then it 
can allow the execution to proceed to the statem ent following the RCV request, 
after the received messages have been validated.
4.4.2 T ransm ission  and R eception  C ontext C reation
A context is created when the user specifies a SEND or a RCV statement. These 
create transmission contexts and reception contexts, respectively.
R e c e p t io n  C ontex t.  When the interpreter encounters a RCV instruction, 
this message is passed to the runtime module to establish a reception context. 
Recall that a RCV statement is of the form:
RCV S o m e O p  ( P i ,  • • •, P n)
This instruction informs the runtime to wait for at most t replicas from the 
same protocol implementation group to issue a SEND request for the operation 
SomeOp.
Initially, the number of replicas per replica group is t, as the system will tol­
erant to t faults. Over time, as different replicas fail a t different rates, so the 
number of non-faulty replicas per group varies to being less than t as more 
failures occur per group.
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The runtime environment transitions from normal execution to the receive 
message state. When the messages arrive, or the specified timeout occurs 
(based on Tarrive), a fault check is performed and if there is sufficient data left 
in the non-faulty set, execution is returned to the interpreter.
The context takes control from the normal execution to wait for the messages. 
The context does not know which replica group will be sending the messages, 
so it must monitor the incoming requests to determine which group is issuing 
the request. The same fault detection algorithm is applied to the sent data 
at time Tarrive to determine if the correct number of replicas have sent the 
invocation requests.
The local runtime environment keeps a map of replica groups to the replica 
information sets. These information sets contain the number of faulty repli­
cas, the number of non-faulty replicas, the network identifiers for each replica 
and other system information.
Upon successful arrival of the desired messages, the data is unmarshalled, 
the context is destroyed and execution is resumed at the user level.
T ransm ission  C ontext. A transmission context is created when a SEND in­
struction is encountered. This context is responsible for creating the trans­
mission message, transm itting it and waiting for the required replies, on the 
_repl channel.
Creating the Transm ission M essage. This requires the param eters for the 
remote invocation to be marshaled and the header of the message filled 
in with the destination group identifier. These are obtained from the
r u n t i m e  c o n t e x t  local variable area.
M essage Transmission. Once the message is created, it is multicast to the 
process group identified in the header.
At the time of message transmission, all the non-faulty processes in the 
sending group’s replica set will transm it the same message with the
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same contents to destination group, D. Thus n messages will be trans­
mitted to m nodes.
The Waiting Game. When transmission is completed, the replica m ust wait 
for a reply from the destination group. The amount of time to wait is 
bounded by network latency, the processing rate of the replicas in the 
same group as the transm itter and the processing rate of the replicas 
in the destination group. All these factors must be taken into account 
when determining the upper bound of the time to wait before the failure 
detector is invoked.
Network latency is quite an important factor, as it affects when the mes­
sage is first transm itted and when the reply is transmitted. There will
be at most 2nm messages sent.
Figure 4.6 Runtime Context Local Variable Interaction
When replica i in the transm itting group P  sends its message, it cannot 
assume that the other members in the group will send the message at 
the same instant. It must allow time for each group to execute the code 
up to the SEND statement and marshaling time. . Fortunately, as we have 
access the code at compile time, we can calculate this time, p. This result 
can be multiplied by some constant c for each process, allowing time for 
each to run at their own rate, p is determined at compile time, c is a 
runtime calculation that can be set as the system is running.
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A similar time must be allowed for the processing of messages for the 
destination group’s replicas. Let these times be represented by T wait .
Once these values are computed, the sending process must wait for that 
amount of time, unless m replies come in before it. Then it can resume 
execution.
The transmission context has a significant amount of steps to perform in order 
to ensure a fault tolerant environment. Some of the steps are similar to the 
receive context.
When marshaling/unmarshalling parameters, they may contain information 
specific to the current process, e.g. the number of ticks on the clock. It is 
important th a t this information is marked in the marshaled message so it is 
not used as an absolute value in the fault detector.
4.4.3 Id en tify in g  Faulty P rocesses
The fault detector is a component embedded in the runtime. The implementa­
tion is driven from the r u n t i m e  c o n t e x t  and require collaboration between 
it and the C t x M g r  .A process is determined as faulty if it does not send (or re­
ply) a message by a given time or if the data in the message does not agree 
with the other replicas’ equivalent messages.
The detector is invoked when the process is in the w a it  state. This state oc­
curs after the transmission of a message, when the sender is awaiting a reply 
message, or when a process issues a RCV instruction. In the w a it  state, a pro­
cess waits for up to h messages to arrive, where h is the number of non-faulty 
replicas in the replica group which is issuing the messages. If h messages do 
not arrive by the time Twait, the fault detector is activated.
A process indicates that it wishes to wait for a message on a given channel. 
The process then waits on this channel. Detection occurs by each replica in 
the implementation group. The detector is executed against the received mes­
sages from one replica group.
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When the detector is active, the process is in the d e te c t io n  state. Figure 4.7 
contains the state transitions that take place for SEND and RCV instructions. 
The detector attempts to recognize faulty processes in the sending replica set. 
It will recognize two types of failures, fail stop and a limited form of Byzantine. 
Figure 4.7 State transitions of the runtime
Fail stop faults can only be detected after TaTrive has been reached. Those 
nodes which have reached this form of failure will not have sent any messages. 
These replicas are then removed from the replica set, and any subsequent 
communication from them will be ignored.
This recognition scheme has the disadvantage of potentially confusing process 
that have failed with those that are running slowly, or a network th a t is op­
erating very slowly. Both of these alternatives are possible, as machines can 
become quite overloaded for short periods of time due to unplanned user ac­
tivity (e.g. starting a window manager). Ethernet is known to perform badly 
due to the exponential back off characteristic as the network becomes busier 
[22], This why it is vital for Tarrive to be accurately calculated and updated 
throughout the lifetime of the system.
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The problem of a slow process trying to communicate with the system after 
it has been falsely identified as faulty can be addressed as a special case of 
replica activation, described in the Future Extensions, section 6.1.
Byzantine failures, unlike fail stop, m ust be detected while consensus is be­
ing established by the detector. Fail stop failures are detected before the main 
consensus [24] algorithm is run. The Byzantine detector is an integral com­
ponent of the failure detection/consensus phase.
When the detector is run on the messages of a given channel’s message cache, 
the first thing tha t is checked is the number of parameters sent in each mes­
sage. These should be the same value. Those messages from replicas tha t do 
not conform to the determined value are marked as faulty. The fault could 
be malicious (as in Byzantine failures) or a genuine fault due to network 
transmission and reliability problems or a genuine fault in the processor. The 
correct value is determined through a consensus algorithm, described in sec­
tion 4.4.4. It is worth remembering tha t for the special reply channel, _repl, 
all the messages should not have any parameters.
Once the cardinality of the parameters has been resolved, each param eter’s 
value must be checked. Every parameter of the operation is used to check for 
faults.
There is a problem with checking parameters: we assume that the values will 
not differ. This may not necessarily be the case. The processes which send 
the message may receive their inputs from independent sources, or it may 
be stochastic. For example, each process may be connected to its own sensor. 
The values between the sensors probably have a tolerance range which is 
acceptable. When checking for faults using these values this should be born 
in mind. The current scheme does not take this into account, but an extension 
is proposed below whereby this can be added.
The parameters are checked one at a time. The same consensus algorithm is 
applied as the one used for determining the cardinality of the param eter set.
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4.4.4 A ch ieving C onsensus
Turek et al [24] describes the correctness conditions for a consensus protocol. 
A consensus protocol is correct if it maintains:
• Consistency Condition. When determining the value, all the partici­
pants [receiving replicas] agree on the same value and the decisions are 
final.
• Validity Condition. The agreed value must have been some replica’s 
input (sent value).
• Termination. Each agent decides on the value within a finite number
of steps.
The consensus algorithm, shown in Figure 4.8, utilised by ftdl’s runtime, takes 
as an input the data set to check. This data set is assembled from all the repli­
cas which have sent the messages. For example, if param eter i is being vali­
dated, then the data set is populated with the values of all the ¿th parameters 
in the queue for the reception channel from the same replica group.
The value that occurs most frequently is the agreed upon value which will be 
used. However, the frequency occurance of the value of the valid set, returned 
from the determ ine Value routine, m ust be greater than 1. If it is not, then 
we do not have concensus and the system, from the point of view of the current 
replica, will be degenerate as we have no means of discovering which replicas 
are faulty or not. This is the boundary condition and is highly undesirable. 
Generally the minimum number of replicas entering the consensus algorithm 
should be three. As voting is used to determine which replicas are faulty, three 
is the minimum number required to form a majority. If only two replicas are 
used, and they differ, then the faulty one cannot be identified. A third replica 
can be used to break this tie.
Does the presented algorithm meet with the criteria imposed by Turek et 
al [24]? It meets the consistency condition as the same data will be used
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Figure 4.8 Consenus Alogrithm 
procedure determ ine Value
in  dataSet : ValueSet
out faultySet, validSet : ValueSet —»•
local valFreqSet : ValueWithFrequencySet 
V elements in dataSet —>
find cur.elem in  valFreqSet 
if  found increment frequency 
else insert cur^elem into valFreqSet
end V
local valid_value := extractM axFreqValue from valFreqSet 
validSet := extract from dataSet elementsOfValue valid_value 
faultySet := validSet U dataSet \  validSet n dataSet
end proc
as input to all the replicas involved. The (deterministic) algorithm is used to 
select the valid value and this is not changed later. Similarly the valid ity  
condition is met, as the algorithm uses only the data sent by the transm it­
ters. As the consensus algorithm does not loop infinitely, but only for a finite 
size, it does terminate. Thus the term ination condition is satisfied.
As the presented system allows multicasting messages to all the replicas in 
the group, and messages are ordered, the work of Schneider [18] and Dolev 
et al [1 2 ] show that these conditions mean deterministic consensus can be 
achieved and the system can tolerate up to k — 1 failures, where k represents 
the maximum number of nodes tha t we can multicast to. At system startup 
k = t.
4.5 D ealing With Faults
When the discriminating node identifies a particular replica as having failed, 
it must take some action. The simplest action would be to do nothing. This 
produces the result that the number of non-faulty replicas in the set from 
which the faulty replica has been removed has decreased. The total number
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of failures that the system can withstand has subsequently decreased by 1  as 
well. So for a system to be tolerant of t faults, all the replica groups m ust start 
with at least t process replicas.
Another option available to the system is to replace the faulty replica with 
a newly started replica. This replica would need to know the state of the 
system and the state of the replica it is replacing. This approach is discussed 
in section section 6 .1 .
Whatever approach is chosen, dynamic reconfiguration of the system is re­
quired when a node is identified as having failed, ftdl currently does not 
support dynamic replica replacement strategies, but is does remove faulty 
replicas from a replica set.
Dynamic reconfiguration requires tha t the network of replicas adjust to the 
update. Clients and other users of the replica group m ust also adjust their
state.
Fortunately, as ftdl uses a multicast protocol, not very much needs to be done 
when a fault occurs. The identified faulty replica is removed from the Valid 
Replica set of the C t x M g r  to its Faulty Replica set, as shown in Figure 4.4. 
This ensures tha t any subsequent communications from replicas posing as 
replica in the Faulty Replica set are ignored.
One of the advantages of removing faulty replicas from the communication 
group is a potential increase in the overall throughput of the system. As the 
number of replicas involved in the communication aspect decreases, the con­
sensus algorithm (and the number of messages sent on the network) may lead 
to better performance as some agreement algorithms are proportional to the 
total number of replicas [18]. ftdl’s agreement protocol clearly is dependent 
on the number of non-faulty replicas in the group.
This, however, is a limited advantage. As the number of faults increase, the 
overall reliability of the system decreases. As it stops being a ¿-tolerant sys­
tem, it becomes a < t tolerant system. Having replica replacement could help 
in keeping the system tolerant to t faults.
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The runtim e realizes a fault has occurred by examining the faultySet re­
turned from the fault detector, determineValue, algorithm. If the returned 
validSet is empty, then the system has failed and execution is halted. This 
typically occurs when the Combining Condition [18] is violated.
4.5.1 Sum m ary o f Supported  F eatu res
In summary, the language and distributed executive support synchronous 
messaging, fail stop processes, network faults and limited Byzantine failures.
F ig u re  4.9 ftdl Distributed Architecture
U s e r  C o d s
runtime interface
Interpreter Code Set
Runtime Context
Context Manager
Network Interface
}
}
runtime
Network
A modified version of the diagram presented in Section 3.7 is presented here, 
showing how the ftdl environment can be mapped to th a t architecture. This 
is shown in Figure 4.9.
The ftd l environment extends the capabilities of the SPR O C approaches as 
used by Schneider [18] and FT-Linda[5]. Much of the node management and 
communication is based on Laport [14] and Schneider [18]. However, the ma­
jor differentiating factor is the replication model. Both Schneider [18] and 
Lamport [14] expect all the nodes in the system to hold replicas for each pro-
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cess. Lamport [14] does allow his model to run replicas on a subset of the 
nodes, but this is does not change the general approach. These tend to provide 
fault tolerance easily for applications tha t work on a shared-memory princi­
pal, like the Linda extension [5]. All the nodes in the system contain their 
own state, this gets altered based on messages received from the network. 
An implied uniformity exists between clients and servers. Thus it is alright 
for a client and server to be processing on the same node. This immediately 
negates the usefulness of a distributed system. If the client and server are on 
the same host, then the system is not distributed!
fid I supports an independent model. Each replica is an independent entity. 
Clients must explicitly obtain references to (remote) servers for invocations. 
The invocation parameters are propagated to the correct replicas, but each 
must process it differently and then dispatch the results. The replication 
and group communication is an extension to the distributed model and we 
use those entities to provide the fault tolerance. This allows replication of 
potentially computation intensive processes to be done across different ma­
chines. Our model, however, introduces a significant overhead in communica­
tion times.
4.6 The Sim ulation M achine
A runtime interpreter has been written which can execute the instructions 
generated for the simulation machine. This runtime interpreter has been 
integrated into a full simulator which emulates a number of process nodes, 
the runtime environment and network connecting these nodes.
The implemented network that links these nodes is very primitive. It does 
not suffer delay, delivery times are instantaneous and does not fail. However, 
we can represent network failure, or delay by causing particular replicas to 
fail (or delay). A full model for a network is beyond the scope of the current 
study.
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This simulator models the interactions between interacting processes on dif­
ferent nodes. This allows us to study the effects of fault tolerance on the 
processes and ultimately, the effect or reliability of the system.
Each protocol implementation is represented as a process on its own host 
(node). For the sake of this model, a process represents a unique node.
Tolerance to failures are established by using replicas. These replicas exe­
cute the same code as their originators, they receive the same communication 
messages, and collaborate to determine which replicas are faulty. Each replica 
represents a process executing at a separate node.
4.6.1 U ser In terface
In itialising The Environm ent
The user specifies the gen files containing the protocol implementations it 
wishes to execute. It must also specify the number of replicas per process 
to be used. The greater the number of replicas, the system becomes more 
tolerant to failures.
F ig u re  4.10 Environment Initialisation ______________________
Z:\prime_rcv.gen
Z:\prime_send.gen Add File
Remove File |
Number of Replicas
OK
Cancel
Once these parameters have been specified, the system is initialised and exe­
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cution can begin. Figure 4.10 shows the initialisation screen.
Each replica cell, shown in Figure 4.11 , contains the runtim e information 
for th a t process. This area is divided into eight subsections and two control 
points.
Figure 4.11 Replica Cell ___ ___  ___
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The information subsections convey:
• the replica group identifier of the process, as defined by the Init state­
ment;
• the probability of failure. This percentage can be dynamically set while 
the system is running;
• the channel list. These are all the channels declared for the protocols;
• the wait channel list. This indicates which channels are expecting data. 
It is situated beneath the channel list;
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• a status area. This indicates the execution state of the replica.
• data stack;
• local variable status area -  displaying the names values of the local vari­
ables
• the instruction list
Figure 4.11 shows a replica about to execute a RCV instruction.
Sim ulator Screen
The main simulation screen consists of a window divided into cells. Each 
cell represents a replica process running on its own node. Each row of 
cells represents one replica group. Figure 4.12 shows the screen for two 
replica groups, with three replicas in each group. The bottom row of 
replicas -  the “ElevensesWaiter” process group -  are indicating tha t they 
are about to send data. The message displayes is informational, and not 
a status.
A replica can be “paused”, “executing”, “waiting” or “faulty”. The first 
state means that the instruction pointer is advanced through user in­
tervention -  by use of the step button -  as opposed to being internally 
driven.
The executing state means that a statement is currently being executed. 
The waiting state means that the replica is awaiting a reply from a re­
mote invocation. The channel it is waiting for is listed in the wait chan­
nel list.
The last state, faulty, is for information purposes only. When a replica 
is identified as faulty, the status field displays a message tha t it is; all 
execution stops for the replica.
• the instruction list shows all the instructions, in the form as generated 
by the compiler, for the replica.
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Figure 4.12 Main Simulator Screen
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• the data stack. The user can see as values are added and removed from 
the stack. In figure 4.11 the values on the stack represent the number 
of arguments this operation requires, in this case 1 ; the local variable to 
receive the value, in this case the variable check_num (variable counting 
begins at 0). The last number on the stack is the reference to the channel 
th a t is to receive the data.
Execution can be controlled on a cell-by-cell bases or applied to all the replica 
cells. Each cell has two control button -  a play/pause and step button. The 
play button means tha t the replica is self driven. It executes instructions 
on its own, no user intervention is required. However, if the replica is in 
the “paused” state, then user intervention is required to advance the instruc­
tion pointer. This is done through the step button. The replicas start in the 
“paused” state.
Every cell has these buttons, but there are global buttons, contained on the 
frame of the window, which operate on all the replicas when pressed.These
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buttons provide the play, pause and step functionality. Pressing any of these 
applies the action to all the replica cells. So pressing the pause global button 
will move all the replicas to the paused state..
By setting the failure probabilities, we can not only model individual node 
failures, also network behaviour and reliability. By setting all the replica’s 
failure probability to the same value we can show how the system copes with 
a busy network, for example.
4.6.2 M easuring E ffectiven ess
In order to measure the effectiveness of the model, a log file is generated by 
the simulator. This file contains timestamps of when each operation takes 
place. Every action taken by the system and by each virtual processor is w rit­
ten to the log file as a timestamped event. This data is used when presenting
the results in the next section.
93
Chapter 5
R esults
5.1 Introduction
The data presented here aims to show the cost of failure in a simulated fault- 
tolerant system. The following questions will be answered in the course of 
this section:
• How does the system deal with errors? This is presented in section 5.3.1.
• W hat is the degradation as errors occur? This is presented on sec­
tion 5.3.2.
• What is the overhead of the system in the presence of no errors? sec­
tion 5.3.3.
For the system to provide fault tolerance, each process in the system m ust be 
replicated. Whenever inter-process communication occurs, through SEND and 
RCV directives, all replicas m ust take part. Messages are synchronous and all 
SEND’s receive replies.
The recipient of a message waits for all replicas to respond. However, it does 
not wait indefinitely. When a timeout occurs, all replicas tha t have sent mes­
sages are used in the processing; all those replicas which did not send in the 
timeout are marked as faulty.
The system is tolerant for n — 2 faults, where n is the number of replicas per 
process.
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5.2 The Test Case
The test consists of two processes -  a client and a server. The client issues 
25 requests to the server. Each request requires a response from the server. 
When the server receives the request, is processes it, computes the result and 
issues a rely to the client with that vale. Once this response is received, the 
client can continue processing.
The test case was run for various numbers of replicas and at different replica 
failure probabilities. Three, five and ten replicas were used in the test; 0%, 
5%, 15%, 20%, 45% and 65% were the failure probabilities against which all 
the replicas were run. Each combination was run 5 times.
The data presented does not measure network communication time. As this 
is its own varied and deep research area, attempting to simulate a network 
is beyond the scope of this study. Each network has its own characteristics 
of latency and message arrival, this would have added another variable to 
digest. However it is vital for such costs to be factored in as this is an area of 
utmost importance as the number of inter-communicating replicas increases. 
The network presented here is, unfortunately, artificial. The simulation lived 
in a perfect environment, where data is received the exact moment it is sent!
The current implementation does not support replica replacement, whereby 
a faulty replica is replaced by a newly started one. This ability would have 
significant impact on the duration of the system as well as its performance. 
As faulty replicas would be replaced by new replicas, a steady state could be 
introduced where a certain level of replicas would always be present in the 
system preventing the system from failing completely.
Performance, however, would be compromised as the negotiation required 
among the non-faulty replicas to start up a new replica would be quite signif­
icant. In fact some of the non-faulty replicas may become faulty during this 
procedure. Computation effort would be expended not on the required prob­
lem (the user code), but on system maintenance. This is part of the balance
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tha t must be achieved between the conflicting aims of availability, responsive­
ness and performance.
Presented below, in Figure 5.1 is the test case for the first run of the sys­
tem. The client is the process which implements the protocol n u m . s e n d e r  
the server process is the implementations the protocol e l e v e n s e s - p r o t o c o l
5.3 The R esults
5.3.1 D ealin g  With Errors
When a node identifies another as having failed, it must handle this fault. 
The system marks the failed node as faulty, removes it from its acceptable 
replica set and then continues processing, if possible.
When the number of nodes in the replica set becomes less than two and the 
other replicas have sent their messages for this invocation, or have timed out 
and the data from both of the remaining nodes differ, the current node cannot 
continue processing and thus will terminate.
Thus a node will terminate if it completes normal processing or n — 2 failures 
have occurred.
Referring to Figure 5.2, we can see a relationship exists between the number 
of replicas, the failure probability level and the amount of system execution 
successfully completed. Table 5.1 shows that system did not run error free at 
any failure level. However at certain points the percentage completion was 
very high. It is interesting to note, that even without active replica activation, 
an optimum relationship could be attained with the number of replicas at a 
given failure level.
For a given probability of failure, there exists an optimum number of replicas 
for which the system completion reaches a maximum. Table 5.1 shows that 
for a 5% probability of failure, the optimum number of replicas is 5. Having 3 
replicas only produces 19% system completion, whereas 10 replicas produces
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F ig u re  5.1 Eleven Test
-  Server communication protocol
Elevenses_protocol —>isPrime( given_num : Integer ) : Integer end elevenses_protocol
-  Client Code
define num_sender —»RemoteClient: elevenses_protocol; coun t: Integer; param eter : Integer; is .eleven : Integer
Rem oteClient!nit( “eleven-checker” );ID( “ElevensesWaiter” );
count :=0; param eter := 1 1 ;
REPEAT ->is_eleven := RemoteClient.isPrime( param eter ); count := count +1 UNTIL count > 25 end num_sender
-  Server Implementation
define elevenses_protocol —>■ check_num : Integer; is_eleven : Integer; coun t: Integer
-  initialisation
ID( “eleven_checker” ); is.eleven := 0; check_num := 0; count := 0 ;REPEAT ->-  wait for a request
RCV isPrime( check_num );IF check_num =11 THEN is_eleven := 1 end;RETURN isPrime is_eleven; count := count +1 UNTIL count > 25 end elevenses_protocol
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Figure 5.2 Completion vs. Probability of Failure
%  Complete vs Increasing Failure Probability
88%, both of which are less than the 92% completion exhibited by the 5 replica 
case. Thus having too few replicas as well as too many can have a detrimental 
effect.
This situation, where the 5 replica scenario dominates all others is observed 
for the 5% and 15% failure cases. Referring again to Figure 5.2, the 10 replica 
line crosses the 5 replica line at about 18% failure probability. This is the 
point where the effectiveness of 5 replicas has diminished. At the 20% failure 
level, 10 replicas complete 36% of the system, whereas 5 replicas complete 
22%. Though this gap is not too big, it becomes very evident at the 45% 
failure level where 10 replicas complete 26% of execution, but the 5 replicas 
only 8%. There seems to be a minimal advantage of increasing the number of 
replicas.
Failure can occur as a result of a replica becoming faulty or a message being 
faulty. With more replicas, there are more messages transm itted per invoca­
tion. Each of these is subject to failure. In order to determine the optimum 
number of replicas, the number of replicas plays an important role. Not only 
does it provide more resilience as the failures increase, but it has a negative 
impact on the total number of messages transmitted. At low probabilities of 
failure, the probability of the replica failing is low but the probability of a 
message failure depends on the total number of replicas. If a process group
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consists of 10 replicas and there are 2 process groups, the total number of 
messages involved in a send-reply scenario is 20 messages per invocation. 
For the test presented in Figure 5.1 one invocation occurs per iteration of the 
main loop, there are 25 iterations in total. This gives 500 message trans­
fers, whereas 3 replicas per process group yields 150 messages. The system 
is being swamped with the number of messages compared to the number of 
replicas when there are 10 replicas per process group at low probabilities of 
failure.
FAILURE N u m b e r  o f Av e r a g e % C o m p l e t e
P r o b a b i l i t y R e p l i c a s R u n  T i m e
5% 3 32723 19%5 28679 92%
10 35547 88%15% 3 34724 20%5 34251 41%
10 44795 32%
20% 3 41201 2UW~5 34787 22%
10 37741 36%45% 3 43658 4%5 59203 8%
10 46141 26%65% 3 40717 9%5 53903 20%
10 39574 23%
Table 5.1: Replica Count, Failure Probability and Average Invocation Time
It is interesting to note that the system also exhibits a convergence of system 
completion for a given replica count and failure probability. This can be used 
to measure the effectiveness of the number of replicas. At the 65% level, for 
example, the difference in completed system execution between 10 replicas 
and 5 is only 3%.
At the 20% failure level, 3 replicas complete 20% of the system, where as 5 
complete 22%. This is only a difference of 2%.
Using this observation, we can see th a t there exists a threshold level for the 
number of replicas at a given failure level. If the number of replicas is within 
this threshold, the percentage completion does not vary greatly between the 
actual replica counts. We can see this window in the Figure 5.2, where the
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distance between the replica lines is very small. Thus from the 20% to 48% 
failure level, this threshold would be 5 replicas. Having between 3 and 5 
replicas would not greatly effect the amount of the system actually executed.
This window then changes at the 55% to 65% failure range, where the thresh­
old is 5-10 replicas.
5.3.2 The Effect o f Errors and R eplicas -  Perform ance  D egradation  o f th e System
Two main aspects of the system degrade as the number of failures increase. 
The general availability of the system sharply declines as the failure probabil­
ity increases, regardless of the number of replicas. As the failure probability 
rises from 5% to 65%, percentage of the number of runs where the system 
actually completed falls sharply. At higher failure levels (>20%), the system 
halts at about the same execution point regardless of the number of repli­
cas. This is because at these high level, the number of replicas failing per 
invocation is very high. For example, at 45% failure with 10 replicas, in the 
5 test runs of the system, the number of replicas failing between the first 
and second invocations was about 4. It is doubtful that having active replica 
activation available would increase the survivability of the system, as these 
highly fault prone replicas would have to communicate to reach a consensus 
that new replicas must be started. Figure 5.2 clearly illustrates this.
The other aspect that leads to system degradation is that, as the probability 
of failure increases, the average invocation time per operation also increases. 
Referring to Figure 5.3, as the number of failures rise (indicated by the in­
crease in failure probability), the average invocation time increases sharply.
The replicas exhibit a similar invocation time profile. A slight rise occurs, 
then a sharp dip, followed by gradually increasing phase and then a sharp 
dip. Table 5.1 shows the average invocation time figures. These are very 
much influenced by the number of replicas, failure distribution and system 
completion.
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F ig u re  5.3 Average Invocation Time vs. Probability of Failure
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The graph shows tha t as the number of failures increases, the average - 
invocation time also increases. This is part of the cost of failure in the system. 
As each non-faulty node tries to discover which nodes are faulty the overall 
performance degrades.
This can lead to the conclusion tha t the effect of failure on the system has 
the same impact on performance as having lots of replicas. That is to say, the 
performance impact of replicas, in a zero failure environment, is equivalent to 
the system recovering from failures. So the cost of a failure can be expressed 
in terms of having extra replicas -  or vice versa. This topic will be further 
explored in the next section, section 5.3.3.
The dips can be explained as massive failure points. When a large number 
of replicas fail around the same iteration, the system has less “baggage” for 
subsequent communications. As there is no facility to s ta rt new replicas, the 
number of replicas tha t survive after the first few initial iterations is signif­
icant. Consider the 20% failure probability case with 10 replicas. Here, the 
number of replicas failing before the fifth iteration is 5, on average. That 
is, over half of the original replicas are left on the sixth iteration. Thus the 
system would perform like a 5 replica case.
Generally, the time taken to execute the system has an inverse relation to the
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percentage of the system completed. This relationship is influenced by the 
number of faults; if the system halts due to too many failures, the time taken 
to execute this incomplete run is greater than the time taken to do a full run. 
This is because of the failure identification algorithm and removal of faulty 
replicas from a non-faulty replica’s communication set. For example, when 
3 replicas have only completed 4% of execution, it takes 43658 ticks; where 
as 20% completion takes 34724 ticks. These numbers are similar for other 
probabilities and failure levels. Table 5.1 shows this.
Another factor in this phenomenon, is that as more faults occur, there are 
fewer surviving replicas on a system wide basis. Thus the communication set 
a t each replica is smaller with each failure and, when subsequent interactions 
occur, the data tha t m ust be validated forms a smaller set.
5.3.3 R eplica  O verhead  
F ig u re  5.4 Replica Cost
Invocation Cost at 0% Failure Probability
To measure the cost of system overhead, the test was run at a zero level of 
probability failure level for all the replica scenarios. Table 5.2 below presents 
these results. The system was also run with one replica. This helps give a 
baseline figure.
The replica overhead is measured as the total execution time of the system 
divided by system execution time for the one replica case. Also shown in
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the table is the average invocation time. This measures the amount of time 
taken when a replica receives all of its messages, inspects them for faults and 
then finally dispatches them to the application code. The graph, shown in 
Figure 5.4, helps to illustrate this.
Number of Replicas System Execution Time (ticks) ReplicaOverhead Average Time Per Invocation
1 679640 n/a 27185
2 702770 3% 281103 718320 5% 28732
10 716390 5% 28655
Table 5.2: Replica Cost at 0% Failure Probability
It is interesting to note tha t a maximum appears to be reached for the over­
head and the average invocation time, relative to the no-cost option. As these 
figures do not include network communication times, this would factor in 
greatly as the number of replicas increases. However as these figures are 
not present, we can see the system overhead.
5.4 Conclusions
These results have shown that while the cost of having replicas is between 
3% and 5% the increase in survivability of the system can be worth it. But 
these results also indicate th a t research needs to be done in measuring the ef­
fectiveness of having replica activation incorporated into the model. Perhaps 
with this feature, the upper limit of the number of replicas for a given failure 
probability can be removed. Section 5.3.1 shows that there is an ideal num­
ber of replicas for a particular failure level. If this number is not met then the 
overall usefulness of the extra replicas is reduced.
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C onclusions
The central aim of developing the f t d l  environment was to provide an inte­
grated approach to enable the construction of fault tolerant systems. By pro­
viding language and runtime support, f t d l  is a system th a t allows transparent 
fault-tolerance. Through the use of collaborating replicas acting as a group, 
interacting with other replica groups, fault-tolerance is provided. The dis­
tributed model used is based on communicating processes; the fault-tolerance 
mechanisms are based on a hybrid approach of the mechanism used by dis­
tributed shared memory and communicating process systems.
A language and compiler were developed to provide the user to develop fault 
tolerant applications. This language is lightweight but was developed to allow 
the system to obtain compile time information from the user code. This is a 
very important requirement as the system needs to know the semantic nature 
of remote invocations and the manner in which parameters are used and their 
values obtained. Using a custom language has provided some considerable ad­
vantages. It allows us to identify the features required in a target language 
and compiler that are required for building fault tolerant systems. Though 
f t d l  is lightweight it provides a minimum set of features required for build­
ing distributed programs. Branching, looping, remote operation invocation, 
receiption of operations from clients and the use of local variables are all in­
cluded. By scoping the language we were left to focus on the support required 
from the compiler. For example, for modules (in the case of f t d l  these would 
be protocol declarations), we need to be able to identify if an operation is de-
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terministic or if the output from it is stochastic. A major feature missing from 
the language is the lack of support for non-determinsism. This was deemed 
beyond the scope of the current work but is an area which requires further 
investigation as it is very important. If we had chosen to use an existing lan­
guage, the implementation would have been forced to put with limitations of 
tha t host language -  for example trying to extend C++, a non-distributed lan­
guage, would have required a work around to add in distributed concepts. A 
lot of information is required as a result of the compilation phase.
The ftdl language can be replaced by another, but not without some loss in 
the amount of fault tolerance that could be required. If the ftdl system was 
to be integrated into an existing language, the important requirement would 
be to have a compiler for the replacement language. If ftdl was replaced, the 
compiler for the replacement language would need to gather the semantic 
information required by the runtime environment.
The ftdl system can be integrated into existing languages and environments. 
Doing this, however, would require compromises to be made. One of the major 
compromises would the loss of language support. Ideally an integration with 
another language should require such an integration to be non-intrusive. The 
steps required for fault-tolerance at the language level should be minimal. 
For example, if every remote invocation would need to be preceded by some 
statem ent this would not be a good integration. The compiler and integration 
layer should notice that the remote invocation is taking place.
This thesis has shown what features are required to implement a distributed 
system that tolerates failure. It is important when implementing such a sys­
tem that the correct parameters are used to ensure tha t the overhead associ­
ated with fault tolerance do not detract from the actual application.
When determining the number of replicas required it is important to look at 
the results presented in Chapter 5. By increasing the number of replicas in a 
system, the number of failure points has increased. Not only can the original 
user processes fail, but so can the replica processes added by the ftdlsystem.
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The number of messages sent per invocation also increases as the number of 
replicas increase. So the possibility of a message failing also increases.
However, having a small number of replicas does decrease the number of fail­
ure points, but the number of failures which can be tolerated has also de­
creased, resulting in a system that is less likely to withstand failures. When 
selecting the number of replicas, we want to avoid the system causing failures, 
by adding more failure points.
The survivability of a distributed system is not directly linked to the number 
of replicas in a process group. That is, increasing the number of replicas in 
a replica group may not increase the total survivability. The effectiveness of 
the number of replicas depends on the probability of failure; at low probabil­
ities, a system can have too many replicas thereby swamping the number of 
replicas. Determining the optimum number of replicas to achieve maximum 
survivability is dependant on the failure probability of the system components 
coupled with the desired number of replicas.
6.1 Future E xtensions
A major area tha t requires investigation is dynamic replica activation. This 
feature allows new replicas to be integrated into a running system. Typically, 
the new replicas will replace those identified as faulty. In order to implement 
this, a full checkpointing facility also needs to be developed.
A number of issues exist when a new replica is to be integrated into the sys­
tem. A protocol needs to be defined which allows all replicas in a replica group 
to agree to start a new replica, agree on the host node, transfer the current 
state and integrate the new replica into the system. While this is happening, 
normal operation would need to be suspended. This means that user code will 
not be executed when updating is taking place.
This scheme, with the barrier checkpoint proposed below could help integrate 
slow replicas which were erroneously identified as faulty to be updated in
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state and re-join the system. When a previously identified faulty replica a t­
tempts to send a message to a receiving replica, it needs to check that:
• this is the replica it says it is. Authentication is required, perhaps 
through digital signatures [14].
• if the replica is identified as a previously faulty one, it was marked as 
faulty because it did not send a message by the appropriate time. That 
is, it was slow and not faulty. The C t x M g r  will need to check this by 
referring to the request identifier and then using the update algorithm, 
in co-ordination with the replica group it was a part of, to get the current 
state.
In order to support state transfers, a form of checkpointing is required by 
executing replicas. All the messages sent to a replica group need to be stored 
in order to replay them to a new replica so it can have the same state as the 
others in its group.
It is prohibitive to store all the outgoing messages to a protocol group. This 
can be very time and space intensive and the application may not allow all 
the messages to be stored. A long-living server, for example, will have many 
messages over the course of its life.
A solution to this is to periodically store the state of a replica group and then 
store the delta messages after the storage. If any state updates need to occur 
between state storage points, the destination replica is given the last saved 
state and all the subsequent messages.
This can be supported by allowing a checkpointing facility as outlined by 
Detlefs et al [11]. Let us assume tha t the language, ftdl, would be extended to 
allow checkpointing to occur. This can be achieved through a new language 
statement, or a runtime initialisation method (e.g. checkpoint every 10 sec­
onds) or a combination of the two.
The aim is to store the current state of a replica. This would be used a t a later 
stage as input so another replica could update, or set, its state to the input
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value. When the runtime encounters the checkpoint event, all the replicas 
in the group agree on the state value before archiving locally. This archive 
value, plus message playback is used to update a replica, when requested.
In this sense the checkpoint acts like a barrier, which is akin to the rendezvous 
approach supported by Ada [7] and explained in Principles i f  Concurrent and 
Distributed Programming [8]. The replicas execute independently until the 
co-ordination point (checkpoint) is reached. This can be used to ensure contin­
ual system integrity, as the replicas in a group synchronise their state and re­
move faulty processes outside the normal client-server communication chain.
The desire for a new replica to be inserted into a group is used to maintain 
the Combining Condition [18]. For example, a new replica could be added to 
a group which has incurred failure. This should increase the failure tolerance 
of the system. Another point when replica state transfer could be used is the 
updating of a slow replica. The mechanism for re-integrating slow replicas 
and introducing new replicas to a replica group is quite similar.
When a new replica is to be added to a replica group, the replica is started 
on a node and enters the initialisation state. This will broadcast tha t this is 
a new replica and it wishes to be part of the given replica group. Broadcast 
ensures that all the processes in the system see the message, and thus they 
know who the message is coming from. When using broadcast, authentication 
schemes are not required [24, 14]. All the existing elements of the desired 
replica group will then broadcast their state to the new replica. The new 
replica will use this data to set its state to tha t of all its peers (this is done 
by using the same agreement protocol for normal communications). The new 
replica will now broadcast that it is the new replica in the process group. All 
the processes (replicas) in the system can now update their replica tables. 
Using broadcast ensures that all replicas get the notification and Byzantine 
failures are avoided as the other nodes can know who is sending the message. 
Re-integration of old (slow) replicas is similar to the steps described above, 
however the main difference is how it is initiated.
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Re-integration is initiated when a slow replica, Pi, replies to a message after 
the expected time of arrival, Tarrive. This reply is sent to the replica group D. 
All non-faulty replicas will receive this late-reply and notice tha t it is slow. 
At this point, all the replicas of D will multicast to the non-faulty replicas of 
P and to Pi, tha t Pi is a slow replica needing to be updated. The rest of the 
protocol is similar to that described previously for integrating a new replica.
The channel cache of all the replicas is used as input to the new/updating 
replicas for messages sent after the last checkpoint. As a proposed alterna­
tive, checkpointing can be made to occur when a slow, or new, replica needs to 
be (re-)integrated into the system. This can reduce the storage requirements 
for all replicas.
One of the primary disadvantages of implementing a dynamic replica inte­
gration scheme, as described above, is an increased failure rate. As there 
is significant processing and inter-communication required to integrate the 
replica, failure could occur during this phase. The algorithms involved are 
tolerant of failures, but the system would be less stable and processing re­
sources effectively wasted doing non-application required work.
Other areas which could extended would be the addition of support for asyn­
chronous messaging and notifying user code when failures have occurred.
Though these extensions are required for a fully functional fault tolerant sys­
tem, the model implemented by ftdl provides the basic framework while sup­
porting fault tolerance. This framework is the minimum required for a usable 
system and the results in Chapter 5 reflect this.
6.2 Conclusion
The ftdl model is an example of a hybrid approach derived from work done 
with distributed shared memory systems and state machine approaches to 
providing fault tolerance. One of the main differences in its implementation is 
the replica management; previous systems identified all processes (and data)
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at all nodes, or a common subset, ftdl groups replicas of the same protocol 
implementation and treats these as separate communicating entities. This 
provides a platform for developing systems tha t are fault tolerant, without 
excessive runtime communication. The ftdl system can be integrated into 
existing languages through library support, but at the cost of ease of use and 
transparency.
This thesis has shown that it is possible to construct a fault tolerant system 
that provides transparent fault tolerance and tha t fault tolerance semantics 
can be built into a language. This is achieved by adopting a hybrid approach 
for the distributed process model. The overall cost of replicas has been shown 
to small and non-linear with respect to the number of replicas and system 
execution rate. Most importantly, the model can deal with failures and has 
shown that even without faulty replica replacement an effective fault tolerant 
system can be constructed.
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ftdl Language D escription  and  C om pilation Environm ent
This appendix presents the ftdllanguage’s lexical conventions, EBNF gram­
m ar and a description of the compilation environment. By understanding 
these steps, it should help in the reading of Chapters 4 and 5.
The EBNF notation used can be read as follows. Terms in quotation marks are 
the exact sequence of symbols expected, emphasised terms, as in idjstatement 
are non-terminals these terms are defined separately. A non-terminal is de­
fined by the name of the non-terminal followed by Terms enclosed in 
square brackets indicate that the term is optional. Curly braces indicate zero 
or more repetitions of that term. A vertical bar (“|”) separating terms indicates 
one of the terms, on either side of the bar, can be used.
For example:
impl_statement ::= a s s i g n m e n t | i d s t a t e m e n t
is read as the non-terminal im pl_sta tem en t is made up of an assignment or 
an id_statement. The id.statem ent rule is defined as:
icLstatement “ID” “(“ string literal “)”
An e x a m p le  o f  th is  is: ID  ( '  ' S om eN am e' ' )
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bool char define else elsif endID if int integer proc revreal repeat return string then until
Table A.l: Reserved Words in ftdl
A.1 The ftdl Language
ftdl is a simple language which provides the minimum constructs necessary 
in constructing a viable distributed application. This chapter describes the 
syntax and should be read as a supplement to the presentation of the ftdl 
programming model in Chapter 4. The implementation of the compiler was 
undertaken using the compiler tools lex and yacc L16] which helped to imple­
ment the lexical analyzer and parser respectively.
The compiler takes as input a text file which consists of one or more protocol 
declarations followed by a protocol implementation. The compilation phase is 
divided into, lexical analysis, parsing and code generation. The lexical ana­
lyzer goes through the source file and partitions sequences of characters into 
tokens which are given to the parser. The parser assembles the tokens, using 
the language grammar into an abstract syntax tree to be used by the code 
generator. The generator traverses the tree to output the g e n  to be used by 
the simulator machine.
A. 1.1 L exical A nalysis
ftdl is not a case sensitive language, so tokens m ust differ by more than case. 
The reserved words of the language are shown in Table A.I. These cannot be 
used as variable names or protocol names by the user. Comments begin with 
“— “ (two consecutive dashes) and last until the end of the line. These are 
ignored by the compiler during the parsing phase.
In addition to the reserved words, the lexical phase identifies the entities 
shown in Table A.2 for the parser. The number entity is used in arithmetic 
expressions, boolean expressions, assignment statements and remote invoca­
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tions. The string literal is also used in the same contexts as a number in 
addition to being used in Init and ID operations. An identifier is used to name 
user definitions: variable names, protocol names and the operations of a pro­
tocol.
L exical E n tity D efinition Exam ple
Number 10-9]*.10-9J+ 101String Literal ”[a-zA-Z] [a-zA-Z_]*digit*” “Hello”Identifier [a-zA-Z] [a-zA-Z_0-9] * [0-9] * aVariable3
Table A. 2: Lexical Definitions
A. 1.2 ftdl Grammar
An ftdl source file consists of one or more protocol declarations. Followed by a 
protocol definition. This definition must be of a protocol previously declared.
Protocol Declaration
A protocol declaration describes which operations can be invoked on a proto­
col. The EBNF grammar for a protocol declaration is shown in Figure A.I. 
It consists of a unique name for the protocol followed by an optional list of 
operations and the declaration is completed by the keyword “end” followed by 
the protocol name. Once a protocol has been declared it is considered a type 
by the language. This means it can be used as any of the built in types, for 
example it can be used in a variable declaration.
The minimum declaration of a protocol is:
MinimumProtocol -> 
end MinimumProtocol
This protocol is quite useless in tha t no operations can be invoked on it. But 
it is useful when you want to write a pure client program.
A more substantial example, taken from Chapter 4 Figure 4.1, is:
TimerProtocol ->
start : Integer
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F ig u re  A.1 EBNF Description For Protocol Declaration
protocol-declaration ::= d e c l J i e a d e r  d e c l J b o d y  d e c l - e n d  
declJieader ::= identifier 
decl.end ::= “end” identifier 
declJDody ::= { o p e r a t i o n - l i s t - d e c l }
operation_list_decl { o p e r a t i o n . d e c l }
operation_decl op^name [a r g u m e n t -1  i s t ]  [op_return_fcype] 
opjiame ::= identifier
argument_list ::= “ (” [ a r g . d e c  1“ , ”] a r g . d e c l  “ ) ” 
arg.decl ::= p a r a m e t e r . d e c l  
parameter_decl param_name “: ” t y p e j n a m e  
op_return_type ::= ‘ : ” t y p e - n a m e
type_name “integer’ [“real” | “char” | “string” | identifier 
paranuiame ::= identifier
stop(id : Integer) 
delta(id : Integer) : Real
end TimerProtocol
This declares three operations which can be invoked on the protocol: start, 
stop and delta, start does not take any parameters but returns an integer 
value, stop and delta both take integer parameters but delta returns a 
real (floating point) value whereas stop does not return any value.
P ro to co l D efinition
The source file given to the ftdl compiler must provide a protocol definition. 
This definition must of a previously declared protocol. A protocol declaration 
consists of statements which are executed at runtime. A protocol declaration 
maps to a process at run time in the ftdl runtime environment. The decla­
ration of protocol begins with the keyword “define” followed by the name of 
the protocol to be defined. The EBNF grammar of the protocol declaration is 
shown in Figures A.2, A.3, A.5, A.6 and A.4.
Referring to Figure A.2, the definition body is broken up into two sections: 
the variable declaration section and main execution body. Variables m ust be 
declared before use. To define a variable, a unique name m ust be given and its 
type must be specified. The type may one of the built-in types or a previously 
encountered protocol declaration. An example of a variable declaration is:
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anlnteger : Integer
This declared an integer variable known as anlnteger.
Figure A.2 EBNF Description For Protocol Implementation
protocol_def inition ::= d e f - b e g i n  { d e f - b o d y }  d e f - e n d
defJbegin ::= “define” identifier 
def _end ::= “end” identifier
def_body ::= {l o c a l - v a r - d e c l s } { i m p l s t a t e m e n t s }
local_var_decls ::= { v a r - d e c l  v a r - d e c l
var.decl ::= v a r i a b l e j n a m e “ :” type^name  
variable_name ::= identifier
type_name ::= “integer” | “real” | “char” | “string” | identifier 
impl_statements ::= { i m p l s t a t e m e n t ”} i m p l s t a t e m e n t
impl_statement ::= a s s i g n m e n t |
i d . s t a t e m e n t  \ 
r e p e a t s t a t e m e n t  \ 
i f  s t a t e m e n t  \ 
r e m o t e - c a l l  \ r c v s t a t e m e n t
Following the variable declarations, the main execution body begins. This 
consists of zero or more implementation statements, which can be one of:
assignm entstatem ent, id _ s ta tem e n t, re p e a t .s ta te m e n t,  if  _ s ta tem en t, 
rem o te_ ca ll or rcv _ sta tem en t. These are shown in Figure A.3.
Figure A.3 Statements in ftdl
assignment v a r i a b l e  -name “ : =” a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r
id_statement ::= “ID” “ (” string literal “) ”
repeat_statement ::= b e g i n ^ r e p e a t  r e p e a t - b o d y  e n d - r e p e a t
if_statement ::= i f - h e a d e r  i f J b o d y  e n d i f
remote.call ::= p r o t - r e f e r e n c e  “ . ” op-name { c a l l - a r g s }
rcv.statement ::= “rev” w h i c h - r c v - o p  r e v . a r g s
assignment takes two arguments: the target variable and an arithmetic ex­
pression. The target variable is a previously declared variable whose value 
will be set to the value of the right-hand side of the assignment operator 
(which is “ : =”). The type of the variable and arithmetic expression must be
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the same. So only an integer can be assigned to an arithmetic expression
whose type evaluates to that of an integer.
F ig u re  A.4 Expressions in ftdl
expression ::= a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r  | b o o l e a n . e x p r
arithmetic_expr ::= arit h m e t i c - e x p r “*” a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r
a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r “/” a r i t h m e t i c . e x p r  
a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r “+” a r i  t h m e t i c - e x p r  
a r i  t h m e t i c - e x p r  a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r  
r e m o t e - c a l l  identifier number string literal
boolean.expr a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r “=” a r i t h m e t i c . e x p r  
a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r “<” a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r  
a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r  “> ” a r i t h m e t i c - e x p r
The grammar for expressions is shown in Figure A.4. The type of an expres­
sion is determined by the operator and its arguments. For the binary oper­
ators both arguments must be of the same type. If
the binary operators are boolean operators then the type of the
expression is boolean. The arithmetic operators however, eval­
uate to the type of their operands. No type conversions are performed.
The id_statement is used to name a protocol implementation. It takes a 
string type as its argument.
Two types of execution control statements exist in ftdl: repeat, shown in 
Figure A.5(a), and if, shown in Figure A.5(b).
The repeat statement is used to loop over a sequence of statements. The loop 
term inates when the boolean condition given to the until branch becomes 
true.
The i f statement is used for branching. The body of the i f is executed pro­
vided that the boolean condition evaluates as true. The statem ents dealing 
with remote operation invocation and reception are shown in Figure A.6. The
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F ig u re  A.5 Control Statements in ftdl
repeat_statement ::= b e g i n j r e p e a t  r e p e a t J o o d y  e n d - r e p e a t  
beginjrepeat ::= “repeat” >■” 
repeatJoody ::= i m p l s t a t e m e n t s  
end_repeat ::= “until” b o o l - e x p r
(a) R epeat S tatem ent
if_statement ::= i f - h e a d e r  i f - b o d y  e n d i f  
if-header ::= “if” b o o l - e x p r  
if Jbody ::= i m p l s t a t e m e n t s  
endif ::= “end”
(b) If  S tatem ent
invocation statement, shown in Figure A.6(a), consists of the reference to a 
protocol (a local variable whose type is that of a previously encountered pro­
tocol declaration), followed by a and then the operation name and its argu­
ments. Before any operation can be invoked, the Init operation m ust be called 
to initialise the reference. This takes as a param eter a string which is the 
name of the implementation to which this reference refers.
For the other operations, the compiler ensures that the operation being in­
voked is actually declared in the protocol declaration and all the parameters 
passed match the type in the declaration.
F ig u re  A.6 Operation Invocation and Reception Statements in ftdl
remote.call ::= p r o t - r e f e r e n c e  “ . ” opjname { c a l l - a r g s }
prot_reference ::= identifier
opjiame identifier
call_args ::= “ (” p a r a m e t e r - 1  i s t  “) ”
parameterJList ::= { e x p r e s s i o n “, e x p r e s s i o n
(a) Remote Invocation S tatem ent
rcv.statement ::= “rev” w h i c h - r c v - o p  r e v . a r g s  
which_rcv_op ::= identifier
«  # »  r  -I • , i  «  \rcv_args ::= ( \ r c v - a r g - l i s tj )
rcv_arg_list ::= { t a r g e t - v a r  “ t a r g e t - v a r  
target_var identifier
(b) Reception S tatem ent
117
A.2. COMPILATION
Similarly with the RCV, shown in Figure A. 6(b), the compiler ensures tha t 
the operation being received has been declared in the current implementa­
tion’s protocol declaration and tha t all arguments’ types match the declara­
tions. When receiving an operation, the values are stored into variables, so it 
is important the rcv_args are all variables, previously declared. The exact 
number and type for the parameters must be given for the invocation and RCV 
statements.
A.2 Com pilation
The compilation unit for the ftdl compiler is a single file. For code to be gen­
erated, this file contains at least a protocol declaration and only one protocol 
implementation -  there can only be one protocol implemented per file.
The compiler itself is single pass and does not perform any preprocessing. In 
order to share a protocol declaration between its implementation and clients, 
the user can either copy the declaration in the implementation file and client 
file, as shown in Figure A. 7.
Another approach is to use a preprocessor and invoke tha t prior to running 
the ftdlcompiler.
The compiler is invoked by supplying the name of the file containing the code 
as an argument. So to compile the two files in Figure A.7 the following com­
mands would need to be executed:
1% ftdl prot_impl.ftdl 
2% ftdl prot_use.ftdl
The compiler produces a file with extension . gen. This is loaded by the sim­
ulator.
A.3 End Remarks
Though ftdl is a small language it has most of the features required for build­
ing distributed applications. The basic program building blocks are built into
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F ig u re  A. 7 Copy Approach To Sharing Protocol Declarations
-- File: prot_impl.ftdl 
-- Implementation of Protocol
-- Protocol Declaration
Elevenses_protocol ->
isPrime( given_num : Integer ) : Integer
end Elevenses_protocol
-- Server Implementation 
define elevenses_protocol ->
... implementation of 
... protocol ''Elevenses_protocol'' 
end elevenses protocol
-- end of file prot_impl.ftdl
-- File prot_use.ftdl
-- A client who uses the Elevenses Protocol
-- The protocol(s) this client wishes to 
-- use are copied here:
-- Protocol Declaration
Elevenses_protocol ->
isPrime( given_num : Integer ) : Integer
end Elevenses_protocol
-- the client
Num__Sender -> 
end Num_Sender
define Num_Sender ->
... the client code ... 
end Num_Sender
-- end of file prot_use.ftdl
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the language: control structures in the form of branching and looping; vari­
able declaration and storage. Also included are primiatives to allow the build­
ing of distributed programs — invoking and servicing operations, remote pro­
cess naming and identification. By using these features useful distributed 
programs can be built which are ideal for simulations. One major area miss­
ing is tha t of non-determinism.
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